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RECENT DECISIONS
BANK nUTCY-WILFrIL AND MALIcIous INjuIY-BuRDE- OF Proor.-The plaintiff
brought suit against the defendant, a bankrupt stockbroker, for conversion of stock.
The conversion, which was not denied, consisted of an inadvertent, unauthorized
hypothecation by one of the defendant's employees, shortly before the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy against him. The plaintiff contended that this debt was not

dischargeable in bankruptcy. Held, one judge dissenting, that since the liability did
not arise from a wilful and malicious injury to property it was not barred from
discharge by Section 17a (2) of the Bankruptcy Act. Judgment reversed. Brown
v. Garey, 267 N. Y. 167, 196 N. E. 12 (1935).

One of the aims of the Bankruptcy Act is to relieve the honest debtor from the
shackles of debt incurred through business misadventure.' On the other hand, the
Act is not intended to accord the malfeasant debtor immunity from liabilities incurred
by his dishonest manipulations. 2 To preclude such escape there was incorporated
in the Act of 1898 a section,3 denying an intentional wrongdoer discharge from
liabilities incurred by wilful and malicious acts. 4 This section, while dear in its
terms, poses a difficult problem. The courts are called upon to draw a definite line
of demarcation between intentional and unintentional wrongs.5 In the early federal
cases, it was held that a deliberate conversion was not a "wilful and malicious injury"
within the contemplation of the Bankruptcy Act.0 Subsequent decisions in the state
courts departed from the spirit of the federal cases and exempted from discharge
those liabilities arising from intentional conversions. 7 A further extension of the scope
of this section was effected by the application of the rule of constructive "malice and
wilfulness" that an intention to do harm is imputed to one who does an act wantonly
1. See Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 439 (1904).
2. See In re Grout, 88 Vt. 318, 321, 92 Atl. 646, 648 (1914).
3. BAvxnuprcy Acr, § 17 a (2), as amended by 32 StrT. 798 (1903), 11 U. S. C. A. §
35 (2) (1926). Section 17a (2) appeared for the first time in the Act of 1S98, but
included only liabilities reduced to judgment. The amendment of 1903 substituted the word
'liability" for "judgment." See Swift & Co. v. Bullard & Son, 3 F. (2d) 814, 815 (N. D.
Ga. 1925).
4. Various definitions have been offered as to the meaning of "wilful and malicious
injury": (1) " . . . wilful disregard of what one knows to be his duty, an act which is

against good morals and wrongful in and of itself, and which necessarily causes injury
and is done intentionally, may be said to be done wilfully and maliciously, so as to come
within the exception?' Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 487 (1904); (2) " ... a wrongful
act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse." Peters v. United States, 177 Fed.
885, 887 (C. C. A. 7th, 1910) ; (3) "It is wilful because it is voluntary, and it is malicious,
because it is intentional." Smith v. Ladrie, 93 Vt. 429,431, 129 Atl. 302, 303 (1925).
5. In re Kubiniec, 2 F. Supp. 632 (W. D. N. Y. 1932); cf. White v. Morris, 31 Ga.
App. 710, 121 S. E. 704 (1924); see In re Roberts, 290 Fed. 257, 259 (E. D. Mich. 1923).
6. In re Ennis & Stoppani, 171 Fed. 755 (S. D. N. Y. 1909) (where broker deliberately
converted stock, yet was granted relief). The Supreme Court seems to abide by this determination. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U. S. 328 (1934). Compare Davis v.
Aetna Acceptance Co., supra and Wood v. Fisk, 215 N. Y. 233, 240-241, 109 N. E. 177, 178
(1915) with Mason v. Sault, 93 Vt. 412, 108 AU. 267 (1919).
7. Van Eps v. Aufdekamp, 32 P. (2d) 1116 (Cal. App. 1934); Mason v. Sault, 93
Vt. 412, 103 Atl. 267 (1919).
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and in disregard of the rights of others. 8 The purview of the section was again
amplified by imputing the wilfulness and malice of an agent to his principal.0 In
Kavanaugh v. Mclntyre, 0 a New York court denied a bankrupt discharge from
liability incurred by his partner's wilful conversion in the course of the partnership
business, although the bankrupt himself was free from actual guilt. Though the field
of these acts classified as wilful and malicious has thus been broadened, the evidentiary obstacles in the path of one seeking to prove a debt non-dischargeable under
this section present a serious problem to the creditor. Because the discharge in
bankruptcy is prima facie evidence of the bankrupt's release from al his debts, 11
the burden of proving the wrong "wilful and malicious" is placed upon the plaintiffcreditor.12 However, where, as in the instant case, the facts of the transaction from
which the liability arose are peculiarly within the knowledge of the bankrupt, slight
evidence offered by the creditor will cast the burden of going forward upon the
bankrupt.'8 The creditor's difficulty is aptly illustrated by the instant case. Here,
once the defendant had presented his explanation, the plaintiff-creditor, because of the
nature of the circumstances surrounding the transaction, was manifestly unable to
refute it. Consequently, he could not sustain the burden of proof as to the entire
case. Since it is recognized that the rights of an honest debtoy as well as the rights
of an honest creditor must be protected, no change in procedure is recommended.
However, the courts must carefully scrutinize the explanatory evidence
adduced by
4
the bankrupt. In final analysis, the facts of each case control.1

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RAILROAD RETIREMENT AcT.-Suit was instituted in the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia asserting the unconstitutionality of the
Railroad Retirement Act' and praying an injunction against its enforcement. The
Act purported to establish a retirement and pension system applicable to past, present
8. Nunn v. Drieborg, 235 Mich. 383, 209 N. W.-89 (1926); Bell Mfg. Co. v. Cross, 123
S. C. 507, 117 S.E. 196 (1923) (award of punitive damages sufficient to infer malice and
wilfulness). But cf. Rogers v. Doody, 178 Atl. 51, 53 (Conn. 1935); In re Kubiniec, 2 F.
Supp. 632 (W. D. N. Y. 1932).

9. In re Halper, 82 Misc. 205, 143 N. Y. Supp. 1005 (N. Y. City Ct. 1913). But see
In re Shyne, 133 Misc. 306, 308, 231 N. Y. Supp. 429, 432 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (criticizing In
re Halper, supra on question of fact).
10. 210 N. Y. 175, 104 N. E. 135 (1914), aff'd sub. nom. McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242
U. S. 138 (1916). Accord: Lyon v. Prescott, 103 Vt. 442, 156 Atl. 679 (1931).
11. See Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U. S. 328, 331 (1934). The courts or the
parties are at liberty to go behind the judgment and show the record upon which It was
entered. Halligan v. Dowell, 179 Iowa 172, 161 N. W. 177 (1917), appeal dismissed, 246
U. S. 678 (1917).
12. Hill v. Smith, 260 U. S. 592 (1923); see Kreitlein v. Ferger, 238 U. S. 21, 26
(1915); In re Levitan, 224 Fed. 241, 243 (D. C. N. 3. 1915).

13. The defendant-bankrupt had complete control of the stock.

The plaintiff had no

knowledge of the manner in which the defendant's firm functioned. He could hardly
contradict the evidence. This seems to be the argument of the dissenting opinion. Cf.
Perine v. Elmira, C. & W. Ry., 184 App. Div. 814, 172 N. Y. Supp. 396 (3d Dep't 1918).
14. Thus, in the principal case it may well be that the court in accepting the broker's

explanation considered the tension existing in the financial market at the time.
1. 48 STAT. 1283, 45 U. S. C. A. §§ 201-214 (1934).
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-and future employees of all carriers within the scope of the Interstate Commerce
Act, 2 with provision for a pooling fund out of which were to be paid monthly allowances calculated on the basis of age or length of service. A decree was issued granting the relief sought 3 on the theory that certain provisions of the Act improperly
.extended to persons not engaged in interstate commerce. On certiorari to the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia, held, four justices dissenting, that inseparable
features were regarded as contravening the guaranty of due process contained in
the Fifth Amendment and therefore required a condemnation of the entire statute.
The ultimate and general defect was declared to be the incompetence of Congress,
under its authority to regulate interstate commerce, to pass any compulsory pension
-system. Judgment affirmed on other grounds. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
R. Co., 295 U. S. 330 (1935).
Properly considered,4 the decision in the instant case is one of the most vital the
Court has issued in recent years. It affects adversely 1,164,707 persons in carrier
employ,5 and comes at a time when the responsibility of our highest tribunal as the
ultimate arbiter of constitutional issues is figuring more and more sharply in the
arguments of both critics0 and defenders 7 of the status quo.
It is well established that "to regulate," in the sense in which it appears in the
commerce clause of the Constitution, is to encourage, stimulate and improve 8 That
the power so delegated is not limited to the regulation of rates0 and equipment 1 °
-of interstate carriers, but extends to persons who are in anywise engaged in their
employ," has also been settled. And it is equally certain that when so extended, it
may properly apply to the relationship of master and servant between the carriers
2. 41 STAT. 474 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 1 et seq. (1926).
3. Alton R. Co. v. Railroad Retirement Board, 62 Wash. L. Rep. 833 (Sup. Ct. D. C.
1934). For an expression of views criticizing this holding, see Legis. (1935) 23 GO. L. J.
285; (1935) 3 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 115.

4. The instant decision erects a caveat against any further legislative attempt, within
-the framework of our present system, to deal with the subject matter embodied in the
case. The Court is thereby committing itself to a policy which is to be carefully distinguished from its adjudication in the Schechter case refusing to extend the scope of the
commerce power (see Comment [1935] 4 Formmas L. REv. 457). The denial of legislative authority to attack in anywise a specific economic problem posseses a different
significance than a determination of federal jurisdiction over certain commercial activities,
since that determination does not necessarily exhaust the ultimate possibility of their
regulation through other channels.
5. See instant case at 353.
6. A. R. Cohen, Boudin, Fraenkel, What to do With the Supreme Court? (1935) 141
-NATiON 39; CoRw , Twnaiaa or 7= SupRm Courm (1934) 182; Black, Commerce
Clause and the New Deal (1935) 20 Coraz. L. Q. 169.
7. BrEnc, CoNsTnTuTo.z op = Uunrtr ST&T.s (1933) 231; Vaught, Commerce Clause
-of the Constitution (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 153.
8. See Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 47 (1912). Cf. Coawn., op. i.
.supra note 6, at 20.
9. Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co, 218 U. S.
-88 (1910).

10. Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U. S. 1 (1904).
11.

Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1912).
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and such employees. 12 The power being complete in itself, the range of discretion
as to the means adopted is a wide one,13 and is subject only to other provisions of
the Constitution itself.14 Among the limitations which have been attached thereto
are the guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.15 Construed as a guaranty of substantive rights,' 6 due process has often been a stumbling block to federal
legislation purporting to regulate interstate commerce.17 Analysis of the different
approaches of the majority and the dissent to the alleged arbitrary character of
the significant pooling provision, tends to strengthen the conviction that due process,
in its appeal to rationality,' 8 is susceptible to use on controversial issues as an instrument of policy to balance private right with public need.' 0 The rejection of the
plan in general as attaching new incidents to the employment contract by legislative
fiat evidences a determination not to extend the range of responsibility which has
been held to inhere in industrial enterprise under workmen's compensation laws. -0
Fundamental differences in social outlook underlie the division of the Court on the
issue of interstate commerce. In view of previous holdings that the hours of work
of the same employees may be fixed 2l and that the amicable settlement of their
labor disputes may be facilitated, 22 it would seem to follow that the regulatory
power of Congress embraces the terms and conditions of employment in so far as
they may tend to paralyze energy and distract effort in the conduct of interstate commerce. Consequently, it does not appear consistent to deny authority to attack,
within that area, the problem of insecurity and its attendant evils. The haunting
threat of poverty in old age, though perhaps a more subtle factor affecting the fount
of action than a violent strike23 or the physical exhaustion of an overworked body,
12. The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (1908); Southern Ry. Co. v. United
States, 222 U. S. 20 (1911).
13. See Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 203 (1911).
14. Id. at 202.
15. See United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 282 U. S. 311, 327 (1931).
16. Originally, due process was conceived of only as a procedural guarantee, but judiclal
legislation has associated the doctrine with rights of a substantive character. Comment
(1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 619; see full treatment in MoTT, Dua PRoczss or LAW (1926)
passinm.
17. Cf. Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908) (membership in a labor union);
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918) (child labor); see Corwin, Congress's Power
to Prohibit Commerce; A Crucial Constitutional Issue (1933) 18 CORN. L. Q. 477.
18. F. S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach (1935) 35 COL.
L. R.v. 809, 819.
19. Cf. T. R. Powell, Judiciality of Minimum Wage Legislation (1922) 37 HAv. L. REv.
545; see Lerner, Supreme Court and American Capitalism (1933) 42 YA=n L. J. 668, 696.
20. New York Cent. R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917); Mountain Timber Co.
v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219 (1917).
21. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 221 U. S. 612 (1911).
22. Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 281 U. S. 548 (1930).
23. The majority cites but summarily dismisses as sui generis (see instant case, at 369)
the case of Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917) in which the Adamson 8-hour day provision, bestowing millions of dollars of additional wages on employees, withstood a strenuous
attack on its constitutionality only because of the grave consequences entailed in a threatened general railway strike. Appreciating the inference to be drawn therefrom by labor
interests, the dissent accords the case a more searching analysis (see instant case, at 376-377).
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is viewed with something more than academic aloofness by the wage-earner who fires
an engine or operates a switch, and its demoralizing effects upon the vigor and
efficiency of work may well constitute it just as potent an obstacle to the successful
functioning of an enterprise. Even were the distinction between "constitutional
power" and "social desirability" as absolute and inexorabe 4 as the majority would
have it appear, the fact that a pension plan may have been designed to effectuate
the social welfare of the employee detracts not a whit from the regulation of commerce as such.The dual nature of the opinion affords no ground for seeking a line of demarcation between holding and dictum.26 Implicit in the majority's unqualified criticism

of the statute as exceeding in toto constitutional limits is a policy which points significantly to the fate similar legislation will meet.2 7 The decision has been strongly
criticized 2s and was immediately regarded as a possible menace to the future validity
of the omnibus Social Security Bi. -9 It is submitted that these repercussions might
have been avoided, without jeopardy to the integrity of the Court, had the majority
placed a different emphasis on the social considerations which fabricate the judicial
process. 30

DEATH-STATUTE or LUITATIONS-EFFECT OF BARRING OF DECEDENT'S Acrom
UPON SuRv

oR's SuIr

FOR

WRONGFUL DEAT.-The decedent, in the course of his

employment by the defendant, contracted an occupational disease, as a consequence
of which he died. At the time of his death, his personal action for injuries had been
barred by the Statute of Limitations. The plaintiffs, the widow and minor son of
deceased, brought this action for wrongful death under the appropriate Oregon
statute.1 The defendant demurred on the ground that the complaint on its face dis24. The isolation of one category from the other on the assumption that each has a
separate, objective existence tends to overlook the positive fact of interaction between the-e
forces in our legal system (cf. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S.332 [1917], cited note 22, supra),
and as a legal dogma can only lead to a distorted treatment of social phenomena as metaphysical abstractions (cf. Lochner v. New York, 193 U. S. 45 (1905]; Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U. S.525 [1923]).
25. Assuming the validity of the generalization enunciated by the Court, itfollow, as a
corollary thereto, that the judiciary is without authority to inquire into the motive, inspiring the particular exertion of constitutional power. McCray v. United States, 195
U. S.27 (1904).
26. United States v.Title Ins. & Trust Co, 265 U. S.472 (1924).
27. A new pension bill was recently passed with provisions substantially lilke those of
its predecessor but ostensibly based under the power of Congress to tax (P. L. No. 399,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. [1935]). It will require no little ingenuity to overcome the objection
that Congress is powerless to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. Child Labor Tax
Case, 259 U. S.20 (1922).
23. (1935) 35 CoL. L. !tv. 932; (1935) 33 NEw REPuBLIC 34; (1935) 140 NATION SS3.
But see Legis. (1935) 29 Ir.. L. RLv. 794, 796 n. 93.
29. N. Y. Times, May 7, 1935, at 13.
30. See CARnozo, ThE NATu E or THE JUDICLAL ProcEss (1921) 66-97.
1. ORE. CODE AN-N. (1930) § 49-1704. "If there shall be any loss of life by reason of
the neglects or failures or violations of the provisions of this act by any owner ... [certain
designated survivors] shall have a right of action without any limit as to the amount of
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closed that the action was not brought within the period of limitations. On appeal,
held, that while the death statute creates a new right of action, it is dependent upon
the possession by the deceased of a cause of action at the time of his death.
Judgment sustaining demurrer affirmed. Piukkula v. Pillsbury Astoria Flouring Mills
Co., 42 P. (2d) 921 (Ore. 1935).
The pronouncement of Lord Ellenborough in Baker v. Bolton 2 that "in a civil
court the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury"a succinctly sets forth the common law principle, the obvious severity of which ultimately
induced the passage by Parliament of Lord Campbell's Act.4 That Act, abrogating
the rule, served as the prototype of similar legislation in the several American states.
Courts not infrequently have been called upon to determine whether the right of
action for wrongful death, created in favor of designated survivors by these statutes,
is lost by reason of the fact that the deceased's own cause of action for personal
injuries had been barred prior to his death by the Statute of Limitations. The
results are notable for a lack of unanimity.0 This diversity of opinion is attributable
damages which may be awarded." Id. § 1-201. "Actions at law shall only be commenced
within the periods prescribed in this title, after the cause of action shall have accrued... 1
Id. § 1-206. "Within two years,-(1) An action for . . . any injuries to the person or
rights of another, not arising on contract." Id. § 5-703 is predicated upon Lord Campbell's
Act (note 4, infra) but does not repeal or abrogate § 49-1704.
2. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Reprints 1033 (K. B. 1808). Id. at 493, 170 Eng. Reprints
at 1033.
3. This statement, while simply a dictum without mention of authority in what was
only a nisi prius decision, was accepted as a correct recital of the common law. Tho
Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199 (1886). Its earliest expression is to be found in Higgins v.
Butcher, Yelv. 89, 80 Eng. Reprints 61 (1607), where the reason given was that the Injured
person having died, "it is now become an offense to the Crown, being converted Into a
felony, and that drowns the particular offense and private wrong. . . " For a statement
of the policy of the rule and a criticism of the principles on which it is based, see Holdsworth,
The Origin of the Ride in Baker v. Bolton (1916) 32 L. Q. REv. 431, and dissenting
opinion of Baron Bramwell in Osborn v. Gillett, L. R. 8 Exch. 88, 93 (1873).
4. "I. . . . whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect,
or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had not ensued)
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action . . . the person who would have
been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured. . . . II .... every such action shall be for the
benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the person whose death shall have been
so caused ... and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they may thinl
proportioned to the injury resulting from such death... " (italics supplied) 9 & 10 VIa'.
c. 93 (1846).
5. TnTANY, DEArT By WRoNGFUL AcT (2d ed. 1913) § 19. For the statutes of each
of the states, see id. at 485 et seq. It is to be noted that while the purpose of all the
statutes is the same, viz., to create a cause of action in favor of certain designated persons
for death caused under such circumstances as would have rendered the tortfeasor liable to
the decedent, had he survived, they nevertheless differ, in some instances materially, from
Lord Campbell's Act and from each other. For this reason, in the consideration of any
case, care should be exercised to refer to the particular statute governing. For a discuslon
of the inadequacies of existing enactments, see Legis. (1931) 44 HAv. L. REV. 980.
6. The construction of the Pennsylvania statute, for example, has evoked conflicting
conclusions. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Preston, 254 Fed. 229 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918), cert.
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largely to conflicting statutory interpretation and to a reluctance to subject the defendant to the possibility of undue hardship.
The right of action for wrongful death is not a continuation of the right of action
the injured person would have had for personal injuries, but is a new, distinct, and
independent right of action. 7 They have no common source; the latter is founded
on the principles of the common law, the former is the creature of statute, and has
its very inception in the death which at common law extinguishes the other s While
rendering lip service to this concept, many jurisdictions have determined nevertheless
that the "right to be enforced [for wrongful death] is not an original one springing
into existence from the death of the intestate, but is one having a previous existence,
with the incident of survivorship" 9 and that "the present right, although not strictly
representative, is derivative and dependent upon the continuance of a right in the
injured employee."' 1
Such reasoning, it is submitted, is somewhat specious. 1
Since the deceased did not have this right of action when he died, nothing capable
of survival existed. His was the right to recover damages for personal injuries, but
the right to recover damages for wrongful death had no existence before that death.
The plaintiff's cause of action accrued only upon the death of the injured person.' 2
To hold, therefore, that the plaintiff's cause of action is barred is, in effect, to
adjudicate that her cause of action was barred before it came into existence. Moreover, the survivor's action does not seek recovery for the personal injuries suffered
by the deceased, but for the death and the pecuniary loss thereby occasioned.' 3 Thus,
the survivor's right of action should not be subject to an enactment which deals
solely with limitations on the recovery of damages for personal injuries.
The requirement of many of the statutes that the negligence must have been such
as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action, had death not ensued,' 4
has given rise to further controversy. The majority of jurisdictions has adopted the
rule that unless the injured person could have maintained an action for his injuries
immediately prior to his death, his representative cannot maintain the action for
wrongful death, notwithstanding the distinct independence of the two rights of
denied, 248 U. S. 585 (1919). Contra: Howard v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 306 Pa. 518, 10O
AtL 613 (1932).
7. St. Louis, Iron Mt. & So. Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648 (1915); Homievicz v.
Orlowski, 34 Del. 66, 143 At. 250 (Super. Ct. 192S).
S. The common law maxim, actio personalis moritur cur persona, concerned itself vith
the survival and abatement of personal delictal actions. See Tnr,%-Y, op. cit. supra note S,
§ 15; Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort (1929) 29 COL. L. Rxv. 239. For
statutes abrogating the common law rule, see Comment (1935) 4 FoRmiar L. Rnv. 89,
90, n. 6.
9. Williams v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 158 Ala. 396, 400, 48 So. 485, 486 (1903),
cited with approval in Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Allen, 192 Fed. 480, 484 (C.C. A. 2d,
1911) (construing Alabama statute).
10. Flynn v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 283 U. S.53, 56 (1931).
11. See Shumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and Survival Statutes (1924) 23
McE. L. REv. 114.
12. Dusek v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 68 F. (2d) 131 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933); Western &
Atlantic R. Co. v. Bass, 104 Ga. 390, 30 S.E. 874 (1898).
13. 5 SuTHmAND, DAMAGEs (4th ed. 1916) § 1259 et seq.
14. See italicized portion of Lord Campbell's Act, note 4, supra. It is to be noted
that the Oregon statute under consideration in the principal case does not contain this clause.
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action.' 5 It is therefore held that where the deceased's right of action had been
tolled by the running of the period of limitations, 0 as in the principal case, or where
he had executed a release, 17 or bad prosecuted suit to judgment and received satisfaction,' 8 his representative's right of action for wrongful death will be barred. This,
it is submitted, results from a forced construction of the statute. The true meaning
of the clause appears to be that there must have been actionable negligence on the
part of the defendant. 19 The wording has reference to the character of the act or
default, and exempts the defendant from liability to the survivor when, under the
circumstances giving rise to the injury, he could not have been adjudged liable to
the deceased, as, for example, where the injured person had been contributorily
negligent.20 Widespread reluctance to apply these principles is perhaps founded on
broad grounds of policy and expediency. Several courts have probably been influenced by a desire to preclude the initiation of litigation long after the defendant's
wrong.2 ' But whatever the merits of this purpose, the courts ought not to give to
statutes a construction wholly unjustified by the reasonable import of the language
employed by the legislature.

DOWER-INCHOATE-EMINENT

DOMAiN-RIGHT OF WrFE IN AwAI.-Through

condemnation proceedings, land was acquired for public use. An award was made
to the husband as owner in fee. His wife filed a notice of lien claiming that a portion
of the award should be charged with her inchoate dower and set aside to await the
contingency of her survivorship. Two-thirds of the net proceeds were paid to the
husband. The balance was deposited with the city chamberlain and credited to the
husband subject to the wife's claim. The husband moved for an order directing
15. Coulter v. New Jersey Pulverizing Co., 11 N. J. Misc. 5, 163 Atl. 661 (Sup. Ct,
1932); Kelliher v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 212 N. Y. 207, 105 N. E. 824 (1914)
(applying N. Y. CODE CIv. PROC. [19021 § 1902, now N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW [1921] § 130);
Williams v. Mersey Docks & Harbour Board, [1905] 1 K. B. 804. Contra: Rowe v.
Richards, 35 S. D. 201, 151 N. W. 1001 (1915); Hoover's Adm'x v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry. Co., 46 W. Va. 268, 33 S. E. 224 (1899).
16. Coulter v. New Jersey Pulverizing Co., 11 N. J. Misc. 5, 163 Atl. 661 (Sup. Ct.
1932); Kelliher v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 212 N. Y. 207, 105 N. E. 824 (1914);
Williams v. Mersey Docks & Harbour Board, [1905] 1 K. B. 804. Contra: Nestelle v.
Northern Pac. R. Co., 56 Fed. 261 (D. C. Wash. 1893) (applying Washington statute);
Causey v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 166 N. C. 5, 81 S. E. 917 (1914); Hoover's Adm'x
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 46 W. Va. 268, 33 S. E. 224 (1899).
17. Mooney v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 414, 88 N. E. 194 (1909); Michigan v. Boyne
City, G. & A. R. Co., 178 Mich. 694, 141 N. W. 905 (1913) (release executed prior to
injury). Contra: Rowe v. Richards, 35 S. D. 201, 151 N. W. 1001 (1915).
18. Hecht v. Ohio & M. Ry. Co., 132 Ind. 507, 32 N. E. 302 (1892);Littlewood v,
Mayor, etc., of New York, 89 N. Y. 24 (1882). Contra: Blackwell v. American Film Co.,
189 Cal. 689, 209 Pac. 999 (1922).
19. Rowe v. Richards, 35 S. D. 201, 151 N. W. 1001 (1915).
20. Bachman v. Independence Indemnity Co., 297 Pac. 119 (Cal. App. 1931); Field v.
Webber, 132 Me. 236, 169 Atl. 732 (1933).
21. In Howard v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 306 Pa. 518, 160 At. 613 (1932), the action
was brought twenty-one years after the deceased sustained his injuries; cf. Littlewood v.
Mayor, etc., of New York, 89 N. Y. 24 (1882).
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that this sum be paid to him. The Special Term, denying the motion, ordered that
the money be invested by the chamberlain, the income to go to the husband during
his life, and thereafter to his wife for life should she survive him. On appeal from
a judgment reversing the order, held, one judge dissenting, that the inchoate dower
of the wife follows the fund when land is taken by right of eminent domain. Judgment reversed. Matter of City of New York (Cropsey Ave.), 268 N. Y. 183, 197

N. E. 189 (1935).
Courts of various jurisdictions have reached different conclusions when called upon
to adjudicate the rights of the husband, the wife, and the state or its delegates in
the circumstances of the principal case.1 In this conflict of interests most courts
have denied the wife protection,2 although a small but vigorous minority has raised
its voice in protest.3 In ruling contrary to the weight of authority the Court of4
Appeals, in the instant case, has at once settled a moot question in New York law
and indicated that it will not follow a dry logic when the equities are strongly opposed.
The law has ever been desirous that some provision be made for a wife in the event
that she survives her husband, and accordingly, it has zealously guarded dowerr
This protection should be extended to inchoate dower, for it is a valuable subsisting
interest attaching to the land. 6 However, as between the wife and the state or its
delegates exercising the power of eminent domain, the wife has no standing and is
divested of her interest when payment is made to the owner of the fee. 7 But as
1. The legislature may authorize a municipality, private corporation, or an individual to
take private property, provided that the property thus acquired be for public use and
compensation therefor paid. 2 CooL=r, COxsnTrUOzAL LiTATIOS (8th ed. 1927) 1143,
and cases cited; Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R. R. Co., 18 Wend. 9 (N. Y. 1837)
(private corporation); Plecker v. Rhodes, 30 Gratt. 795 (Va. 1878) (individual).
2. Flynn v. Flynn, 171 Mass. 312, 50 N. E. 650 (1893), 42 L. R. A. 98 (1899); Long
v. Long, 99 Ohio St. 330, 124 N. E. 161 (1919), 5 A. L. R. 1347 (1920); Salvatore v.
Fuscellaro, 166 Ati. 27 (R. I. 1933); cf. Venable v. Wabash Western Ry. Co., 112 Mo. 103,
20 S. W. 493, 18 L. R. A. 68 (1892) (voluntary conveyance by husband alone); Choteau
v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 122 Mo. 375, 22 S. W. 458 (1892), 30 S. W. 299 (1894)
(mesne conveyances); Duncan v. Terra Haute, 85 Ind. 104 (1882); Gwvynne v. Cincinnati, 3 Ohio 24 (1827) (dedication to public use).
3. Wheeler v. Kirtland, 27 N. J. Eq. 534 (1875); Matter of Trustees of New York &
Brooklyn Bridge, 75 Hun. 558, 27 N. Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1894), aFfd, 143 N Y. 640, 37
N. E. 823 (1894).
4. The unsettled condition of the New York law was attributable to a difference of
opinion as to whether Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298 (1873), had limited the sweeping
terms of Moore v. Mayor, 8 N. Y. 110 (1853). Flynn v. Flynn, 171 Mlass. 312, 50 N. E.
650 (1898) was decided largely upon an interpretation of the New York casvs which
denied such a limitation. The latter view was accepted by the Appellate Dividon in the
principal case, 244 App. Div. 188, 278 N. Y. Supp. 815 (2d Dep't 1935).
5. "This humane provision of the common law was intended for the sure and competent sustenance of the widow, and the better nurture and education of her children."
4 K=arT, Com .* 35. Dower has always been a favorite of the law. Underground Electric
Rys. Co. of London, Ltd. v. Owsley, 196 Fed. 278 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912). This protective
attitude extends to inchoate dower as well. Byrnes v. Owen, 243 N. Y. 211, 153 N. E.
51 (1926) (cited in principal case).
6.
7.

Clifford v. Kampfe, 147 N. Y. 383, 42 N. E. 1 (1895).
Moore v. Mayor, 8 N. Y. 110 (1353).
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against everyone save the state or its delegates her right should be preserved,8 by
treating the compensation awarded as land, and the fund thus created, as a substitute
for the real property taken. 9 The majority of cases dealing with the question have
reasoned that throughout history 10 public interest has required" that dower be
extinguished when land is taken by right of eminent domain,12 and that this is particularly true of inchoate dower since it is, at best, a contingent claim incapable of
present valuation.' 3 Inasmuch as it does not rise to the dignity of a vested property
interest, runs the argument, it is outside the pale of the constitutional mandate that
property shall not be taken without due process of law.14 The public interest would
seem to be amply protected as long as the wife cannot, in the future, assert a claim
to a life estate in the property. The contention that inchoate dower is at best a
contingent claim, too uncertain for compensation and incapable of present valuation,
ignores those cases which have adopted the method first propounded in Jackson v.
Edwards15 for calculating the present value of an inchoate dowef interest. Although
a few cases agree that inchoate dower is for some purposes to be considered a
8. Matter of Trustees of New York & Brooklyn Bridge, 75 Hun 588, 27 N. Y.
Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1894), aff'd, 143 N. Y. 640, 37 N. E. 823 (1894) ; see Simar v. Canaday,
53 N. Y. 298, 304 (1873); Mackenna v. Fidelity Trust Co., 184 N. Y. 411, 415, 77 N. E,
721, 722 (1906).
9. Utter v. Richmond, 112 N. Y. 610, 20 N. E.554 (1889).
10. In early times a wife was not dowable of a castle which was required for the
defense of the realm. The force of the precedent is considerably diminished, ifnot entirely
spent, when this incident of feudal tenure is applied to the peaceable acquisition of allodial
land by the state; in one case compensation is not necessary, in the other money must be
paid which may be reached even if the land itself cannot. But cf. Venable v. Wabash
WVestern Ry Co., 112 Mo. 103, 20 S. W. 493, 18 L. R. A. 68 (1892).
11. Venable v. Wabash Western Ry. Co., 112 Mo. 103, 20 S. W. 493, 18 L. R. A. 68
(1892); Gwynne v. Cincinnati, 3 Ohio 24 (1827); French v. Lord, 69 Me. 537 (1879).
12. See note 2, snpra.
13. Moore v. Mayor, 8 N. Y. 110 (1853); Venable v. Wabash Western Ry. Co.,
112 Mo. 103, 20 S.W. 493, 18 L. R. A. 68 (1892); Salvatore v. Fuscellaro, 166 Atl. 27
(R. I. 1933), and cases cited therein.
14. Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry. Co., 258 U. S. 314, 20 A. L. R. 1330 (1922); Boyd
v. Harrison, 36 Ala. $33 (1860); Strong v. Clem, 12 Ind. 37, 74 Am. Dee. 200 (1859);
Barbour v. Barbour, 46 Me. 9 (1858); Griswold v. McGee, 102 Minn. 114, 112 N. W. 120,
113 N. W. 382 (1907); Magee v. Young, 40 Miss. 164, 90 Am. Dec. 322 (1866); see
Rumsey v. Sullivan, 166 App. Div. 246, 247, 150 N. Y. Supp. 287, 289 (4th Dep't 1914);
see Note (1892) 19 L. R. A. 256. Contra: In re Alexander, 53 N. J. Eq. 96, 30 Atl. 817
(Ch. 1894); O'Kelly v. Williams, 84 N. C.-281 (1881) semble.
15. 7 Paige 386 (1839); Share v. Trickle, 183 Wis. 1, 197 N. W. 329, 34 A. L. R. 1021
(1924); American Blower Co. v. Mackenzie, 197 N. C. 152, 147 S. E. 829 (1929). The
present value of an inchoate dower interest is ascertained by taking the present value of
an annuity for the life of the wife, equal to the interest in a third of the proceeds of the
estate to which the right attaches, and deducting from it the value of a similar annuity
dependent upon the joint life of herself and her husband. The court in the principal case
preferred to have one-third of the proceeds invested, the interest to go to the husband during his life and then to the wife, for life, should she survive him. It is submitted that the
latter method of protecting the wife is preferable because it treats the fund as a true
substitute for the real property taken.
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valuable right worthy of protection, opinions differ as to whether it is sufficiently
valuable, in the fact-setting of the principal case, to warrant compensation.10
The minority view preserves the wife's interest by awaiting the happening of the
contingency; the majority view destroys it by completely ignoring the possibility of
her survivorship. The law which has considered inchoate dower to be an incumbrance
affecting the marketability of title,17 to be good consideration for a promise,18 to be
an interest entitling a wife to follow the surplus moneys of a foreclosure sale,10 or to
redeem from a mortgage,2 0 should not find it difficult to impress the wife's inchoate
dower on the proceeds of property fortuitously appropriated to the public use.

EFVIDENCE-DYING DECLARATIONS-REALIZATION OF IIPENDUMG U C0NSCIOUSNrss.-The defendant was convicted of the murder of a physician. The state had
been permitted to introduce in evidence a statement by decedent accusing the defendant of the commission of the crime. At the time of making the statement
decedent, being conversant with the effects of the poison which had been administered
to him, realized that his death was a matter of several days but that at any moment
he might lapse into a coma from which he would never be revived. On appeal, held,
three judges dissenting, that the intervention of the contemplated period of unconsciousness did not render the statement inadmissible as a dying declaration. Conviction affirmed. Dean v. State, 160 So. 584 (Miss. 1935).
Statements by the victim of a homicide,' relative to the facts of, and immediately
connected with the crime,2 are admissible in evidence where it can be shown that
16. Compare the following cases: Flynn v. Flynn, 171 Mass. 312, 314, 50 N. E. 650,
650 (1893); Wheeler v. Kirtland, 27 N. J. Eq. 534, 535 (1875); Davis v. Wetherell, 9S
Mlass. 60 (1866); Clifford v. Kampfe, 147 N. Y. 383, 42 N. E. 1 (1895); Buzick v. Buzick,
44 Iowa 259 (1876); Thayer v. Thayer, 14 Vt. 107 (1842).
17. Shearer v. Ranger, 39 Mass. 447 (1839); Porter v. Noyes, 2 Ale. 22 (1822); Jones
v. Gardner, 10 Johns. 266 (N. Y. 1813); Johnson v. Nyce's Ex'rs, 17 Ohio 66 (1848).
18. Bullard v. Briggs, 24 Mass. 533 (1829); Holmes v. Winchester, 133 Masn. 140
(18s2); Motley v. Sawyer, 38 Mle. 68 (1354); Nuns v. Bigelow, 45 N. H. 343 (1864).
19. Vartie v. Underwood, 18 Barb. 561 (N. Y. 1854); Mandel v. McClave, 46 Ohio St.
407, 22 N. E. 290, 5 L. R. A. 519 (1889); Chase v. Angell, 148 Mich. 1, 103 N. W. 1105
(1906). Contra: McLeod v. McLeod, 169 Ala. 654, 53 So. 834 (1910); Kauffman v. Peacock, 115 Ill. 212, 3 N. E. 749 (1855); Elmendorff v. Lockwood, 57 N. Y. 322 (1874)
(purchase money mortgage).
20. Davis v. Wetherel, 95 Mass. 60 (1866); Mackenna v. Fidelity Trust Co., 184 N. Y.
411, 77 N. E. 721, 3 L. R. A. (,. s.) 1068 (1906); Bigoness v. Hibbard, 267 Ill. 301, 103
N. E. 294 (1915); Bonfoey v. Bayne, 100 Mich. 82, 58 N. W. 620 (1894).
1. At early common law dying declarations were admitted in both dvil and criminal
cases. 1 Ganzr.z.Y_-, Evm_.cE (16th ed. 1899) § 156a; UimrEmmL CnnasEJAL Evxomuc2
(4th ed. 1935) § 210. Later common law limited their admission strictly to homicide cases.
Since the original theory of their admison was based on a doctrine of necesnity thbs
limitation represented no logical development but rather public policy. 3 W oaon, EVrDEN CE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 1430-1432. Today by statute in many states the exception to the
hearsay rule under which they are admitted has been extended to trials for abortion. In
two states they are accorded admission in certain civil cases. Notes (1927) 49 A. L. R.
1282; (1934) 91 id. at 560.
2. People v. Smith, 172 N. Y. 210, 64 N. E. 814 (1902); People v. Falletto, 202 N. Y.
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at the time of the utterance declarant had relinquished all hope of survival and
believed himself in the shadow of impending death.3 Whether these requisites for
admission have been complied with is a mixed question of law and fact to be determined by the court from all the surrounding circumstances.4 The inquiry into
whether declarant believed himself at the threshold of death should be conducted
under a realization that the test is to be a subjective one. 5 The interval between the
declaration and dissolution is therefore accorded consideration solely because of its
probative force in indicating the decedent's state of mind on this question0 and it
is not to be regarded as a determinant of admissibility. The rationale behind this
insistence on a mental attitude evincing an apprehension of immediately impending
death is a belief that the solemnity of the occasion provides a circumstantial guaranty
of trustworthiness equivalent to that of an oath in court.7 The accredited sanctions
494, 96 N. E. 355 (1911); Notes (1921) 14 A. L. R. 757; (1902) 56 L. R. A. 353, 368-375;
3 WIGMoaz, EVIDENCE § 1434. The declaration must be limited to statements of fact and
not opinion. 1 GlRaurtnr, EvIDENcE § 159; Berry v. State, 63 Ark. 382, 38 S. W. 1038
(1897); Matherly v. Commonwealth, 14 Ky. Law 182, 19 S. W. 977 (1892); cf. Shenkenberger v. State, 154 Ind. 630, 57 N. E. 519 (1900); State v. Kuhn, 117 Iowa 216, 90 N. W.
733 (1902); House v. State, 94 Miss. 107, 48 So. 3 (1909). But see 3 WiomoRE, EvroyNcn
§ 1447.
3. The rule was stated by Vann, J.: "The absolute requirements preliminary to the
admission of such evidence [dying declarations) are that there must be clear proof of the
certainty of speedy death and that the declarant had no hope of recovery." People v.
Falletto, 202 N. Y. 494, 500, 96 N. E. 355, 358 (1911). Shepard v. United States, 290
U. S. 96 (1933); Oldham v. State, 161 So. 546 (Ala. App. 1935); People v. Selknes, 309
II1. 113, 140 N. E. 852 (1923); Commonwealth v. Polian, 193 N. E. 68 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass.
1934); 1 GREENLEA , EvIDENCE § 158; UNDER=L, EVIDENCE §§ 211-212.
Deceased need not expressly state his belief of impending death; it may be inferred from
his conduct or condition. Smith v. State, 38 P. (2d) 591 (Okla. Cr. App. 1934); People
v. Conklin, 175 N. Y. 333, 67 N. E. 624 (1903); People v. Del Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470,
85 N. E. 690 (1908); Sanders v. State, 36 Okla. Cr. App. 120, 252 Pac. 855 (1927); Rawls
v. State, 76 S. W. (2d) 1053 (Tex. Cr. App. 1934).
4. Oldham v. State, 161 So. 546 (Ala. App. 1935); Freels v. State, 130 Ark. 189, 196
S. W. 913 (1917); People v. Ludkowitz, 266 N. Y. 233, 194 N. E. 688 (1935); see Lane,
The Right of the Jury to Review the Decisions of the Court upon the Admissibility of
Evidence as Illustrated in the Law of Dying Declarations (1903) 1 MIcir. L. Rnv. 624.
The judge decides the question of admissibility, then, even though the jury does not believe
the requirements for admission have been complied with it may still consider and believe
the dying declaration. 3 WGooRE, EVIDNCE § 1451; ci. Commonwealth v. Pollan, 193
N. E. 68 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. 1934); People v. La Panne, 255 Mich. 38, 237 N. W. 38
(1931). By the weight of authority all the essential elements of admisibility must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Note (1935) 96 A. L. R. 621. Contra: Frelhage v.
United States, 56 F. (2d) 127 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); Commonwealth v. Pollan, supra.
S. People v. Selknes, 309 I11. 113, 140 N. E. 852 (1923); People v. Brecht, 120 App.
Div. 769, 105 N. Y. Supp. 436 (1st Dep't 1907), aff'd, 192 N. Y. 581, 85 N. E. 1114 (1908);
see 3

Wimo oE, EVIDENCE §

1441.

6. Bell v. State, 72 Miss. 507, 17 So. 232 (1895); People v. Falletto, 202 N. Y. 494,
96 N. E. 355 (1911); see Commonwealth v. Roberts, 108 Mass. 296, 301 (1871); Note
§ 214.
(1902) 56 L. R. A. 353, 421-423; UNDERmML, EvmCE
7. People v. La Panne, 255 Mich. 38, 237 N. W. 38 (1931); People v. Corey, 157 N. Y.
332, 51 N. E. 1024 (1898); see WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1438. This circumstantial guarantee
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s
are a fear of an after accountability an instinctive awe of the unknown and a belief
purpose to be served.0 By the great weight of
worldly
any
longer
no
is
there
that
authority a mere hopelessness of survival from the present affliction unaccompanied
by a momentary expectation of swift and certain doom does not possess this same
sanction.' 0 Ordinarily the expectation, not the mere fact however, of several days
survival would render a statement inadmissible as a dying declaration." The unique
problem in the instant case was whether a contemplation of survival in a state of
unconsciousness, culminating in ultimate death, would also serve to remove the sanction. The court took cognizance of the fact that all prior enunciations of the rule
were directed toward the mental and not the physical aspect of proximity to death.
It then squarely held that statements made in what the declarant believed to be his
last moments of consciousness bore all the solemnity usually attributed to remarks
2
Once the requisite state of mind was
made at the verge of physical dissolution.'
found to exist, the fact that death did not follow immediately in point of time did
not render the declaration inadmissible. 13 Since the very nature of a dying declaration necessarily deprives the accused of the safeguards of confrontation and cross3
With
examination' 4 it is accorded less weight than testimony given in open court.'
this one limitation its admissibility is too well settled to be questioned. Apparently,

of truthfulness goes only to the competency of the evidence and not to the weight. People
v. Kraft, 148 N. Y. 631, 43 N. E. 80 (1896).
S. WImarop, Evin-,cz § 1443; Note (1902) 56 L. R. A. 353, 419. The element of
retribution in the hereafter has diminished in importance in recent years. Wright v. State,
135 So. 636 (Ala. App. 1931); see People v. Falletto, 202 N. Y. 494, 00S,96 N. E. 355,
358 (1911); (1932) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. RLv. 357.
9. WiGmxo , Eivmmcm §§ 1443, 1446. These sanctions, from experience, have not served
to make this evidence particularly reliable. See People v. Corey, 157 N. Y. 332, 349, S1
N. E. 1024, 1029 (1898). There have been instances of a dying declaration made one day
and contradicted the next. Mloore v. State, 12 Ala. 764 (1848). Other dying declaratioU3
have been revealed as completely false. White v. State, 30 Tex. App. 652, IS S. W. 462
(1S92).
10. See cases cited note 3, supra; Commonwealth v. Griffith, 149 Ky. 405, 149 S. W.
825 (1912); Bell v. State, 72 Mis. 507, 17 So. 232 (1895). See Shepard v. United States,
290 U. S. 96, 100 (1933) ; Note (1902) 56 L. R. A. 353, 391-396. Contra: Freels v. State,
130 Ark. 189, 196 S. W. 913 (1917); State v. Smith, 103 Kan. 148, 174 Pac. 551 (1918);
see (1934) 82 U. or PA. L. RL. 290.
11. See cases cited note 10, supra.
12. In analogous situations in which unconseiousness intervened between an event and
a remark admissable as part of the res gestae if spontaneous, the courts, following a smilar
line of reasoning, likewise ignored the interval and allowed the statement in evidence.
Vargas v. State, 107 Tea. Cr. App. 666, 29S S. W. 591 (1927); see (1935) 4 Forim%--E L.
REv. 346.
13. Oldham v. State, 161 So. 546 (Ala. App. 1935); Commonwealth v. Roberts, 103
Mass. 296 (1871); People v. Falletto, 202 N. Y. 494, 96 N. E. 355 (1911); State v. Craine,
120 N. C. 601, 27 S. E. 72 (1897) (admitted after five months); see Uzmm , EviD xcE § 214.

14. Wright v. State, 135 So. 636 (Ala. App. 1931); People v. Ludkowitz, 266 N. Y. 233,
194 N. E. 688 (1935); Commonwealth v. Mfeleskie, 278 Pa. 383, 123 At. 310 (1924).
15. People v. Kraft, 148 N. Y. 631, 43 N. E. 80 (1896); People v. Falletto, 202 N. Y.
494, 96 N. E. 355 (1911) ; cf. Shenkenberger v. State, 154 Ind. 630, 57 N. E. 519 (190).
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however, accepted enunciations of the requisite groundwork for admission failed to
envisage such a situation as that presented in the instant case. It is submitted, therefore, that this court properly refused to be frustrated by a literal interpretation of
these prior decisions.

JOINT TENANCY-JOINT DEPOSITS-IRIGHT OF MURDERER To TAKE AS SURVIVo.-

The defendant, one of the parties to a joint survivorship deposit account, was con.
victed of the murder of his co-depositor. The administrator of the deceased's estate
contended that the defendant could not claim ownership of the account as survivor
on the ground that public policy would not permit him to benefit by means of his
felonious conduct. On appeal from a judgment reversing a decree in favor of the
defendant, held, one judge dissenting, that the public policy against allowing a crlm,
inal to retain the fruits of his crime cannot deprive him of his vested right in such
an account. Oleff v. Hodapp, 195 N. E. 838 (Sup. Ct. Ohio, 1935).
Owing to the ancient doctrine of attainder,1 no case involving a murderer's capacity
to succeed to any interest in property left by his victim arose in England until some
fifty years ago. 2 In the United States, this question was first adjudicated in 1888,3
and since then opinion has been divided over the application of the conflicting rules
of public policy, statutory construction, and the common law maxim that "no man
shall take advantage of his own wrong. ' 4 Where the taking is by will or intestacy
and there is no statute to the contrary, the weight of authority holds that the legal
title passes to the murderer and may be retained by him.5 In defense of this in.
equitable view it is argued (1) that neither the Wills Acts nor the intestacy statutes
expressly bar a murderer from taking;0 (2) that to deny a murderer his inheritance,
in addition to imposing a penal sentence, is to punish him doubly for the same crime;,
(3) that such action would be tantamount to an attainder and would violate the
constitutional provision against corruption of blood.8 Directly opposed to this line
of reasoning are decisions in a number of jurisdictions which hold that such statutes,
being remedial in character, should be interpreted in the light of equitable principles.
These cases refuse to allow any title to pass to the murderer, and argue that no
1. This doctrine was abolished in England by 33 & 34 Vicr. c. 23 § 1 (1870).

Under

the civil law the murderer was not allowed to take, and the property escheated to the state.
2 DOmAT, Civn LAW (Cushing's ed. 1853) 80. In this country it is provided by the
Federal Constitution that "no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or
forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted." Art. III, § 3.
2. For a history of the problem see Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N. E. 785
(1914).

3. Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794 (1888).
4. BRooif's LEcAL MAXImS (8th Eng. ed. 1882) 279.
5. Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N. E. 785 (1914) (intestate succession);
McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112 (1906); Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240,

6 S. E. 794 (1888) (widow's statutory dower right not barred); Holloway v. McCormick,
41 Okla. 1, 136 Pac. 1111 (1913).
6. McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112 (1906); In re Carpenter's Estate, 170
Pa. 203, 32 Ati. 637 (1895).
7. Holloway v. McCormick, 41 Okla. 1, 136 Pac. 1111 (1913).
8. U. S. CONsT. Art. IUI, § 3; see cases cited note 6, supra.
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0
attainder is effected because the property at no time vested in him. Statutes in con0
The
formity with this view have been enacted in at least twenty jurisdictions.'
problem becomes more complex when the estate involved is a joint tenancy, as in
the instant case, or a tenancy by the entirety. It is then urged that the murderer
has a present vested interest in the whole of the estate, of which be cannot be divested
without working an attainder. 1 The earlier cases reasoned that the interest of the
surviving tenant of a joint estate received no enhancement upon the death of his
co-tenant, inasmuch as he had been seized of an undivided whole from the time of
the creation of the estate.12 Within recent years, however, with the infiltration of
more realistic concepts, it has been held that the estate of the survivor is substan3
tially enlarged by the co-tenant's death.1 It follows then that there is a practical
benefit of which the murderer may be deprived without any infringement of his
vested rights.
The doctrine of the constructive trust offers a helpful solution to some of these
problems.' 4 The letter of the law is observed and the estate vests in the murderer,
but the intervention of equity acting in personam compels the wrongdoer to hold the
5
This disposition is conproperty in trust for the benefit of the heirs of the victim.
sistent with the established formula of equity which in analogous circumstances imposes a constructive trust on profits in the hands of a wrongdoer.ic However, while
7
the trust theory is readily applicable to cases of testacy and intestacy,' the courts

9. Garwols v. Banker's Trust Co., 251 Iich. 420, 232 N. W. 239 (1930); Perry v.
Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S. W. 641 (1903); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22
N. E. ISS (IS89); Estate of Hall, [1914] P. 1.
10. CAL. PRoa. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 258; CoLO. Com. STAT. (Supp. 1932) § 5152.1;
D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 25, § 250; IN. STAT. ANY. (Burns, 1933) § 6-2322; IowA CODE
,. (Dart,
(1931) §§ 12032-4; KAx. Rrv. STAT. AwN. (1923) § 22-133; iA. CIV. CODE Am
1932) art. 966, 1560, 1710; Nlrw. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8734; Mis. CODE A.n. (1930)
§ 3566; NEB. Coin. ST.AT. (1929) §§ 30-119, 30-120; N. C. CoDE Am . (Michie, 1931)
(Harlow,
§§ 10, 2522, 4099; N. D. Comx. LAWS A.xxN. (1913) § 5633; Oxr.A. STAT. A;..
1931) § 1616; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 10-213; PA. ST. Am.. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20,
§§ 136, 244; S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 8874; TFzswN. CoDE Am.. (Will., Shan. & Harlow,
1932) § 8388; TFx. ANN. CIv. ST.A.T. (Vernon, 1925) art. 5047; UTA,%REv. STAT. An:;.
(1933) tit. 101-3-22; VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) § 5274; Wyo. REv. STAT. Ax . (Courtright,
1931) § 88-4009.
11. See instant case, concurring opinion of Zimmerman, J., 195 N. E. 838M,841.
12. 2 BL. Couxur. *184; Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 402 (1878).
13. Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497 (1930); Gwinn v. Commisoner of Internal
Revenue, 54 F. (2d) 728 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932) (interest in joint estate held subject to ectate
tax on one-half the value of the property on death of co-tenant).
14. See Ames, Can a Murderer Acquire Title by His Own Crime and Keep It? (1897)
36 A.m. L. REG. (xe. s.) 235, reprinted in ArEs, Lrcrumrs ox Lr_ r. HMsRon, (1913) 310;
(1930) 44 H v. L. REv. 125; Comment (1931) 29 Micir. L. REv. 745; (1930) 79 U. or
PA. L. Rr-v. 100. For a criticism of the doctrine, see Comment (1931) S N. Y. U. L. Q.
Rzv. 492.
15. A bona fide purchaser for value from the murderer gets complete title, but knowledge of the imprisonment of the vendor constitutes notice. See Exchange Trut Co. v.
Godfrey, 128 Okla. 108, 261 Pac. 197 (1927).
16. 3 Pournoy, EQu=r JuaisRunxr-,cz (4th ed. 1918) § 1048.
17. The criminal legatee or heir is decreed to hold the entire inheritance as trustee for
the other heirs. See cases cited supra note 9.
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are by no means agreed as to its application to joint estates and estates by the en-

tirety. In one jurisdiction the murder effects a severance of the joint tenancy into

a tenancy in common, operating in the same manner as a divorce.18 Other courts
consult the mortality tables and give the remainder to the tenant (or his heirs) having
the greater expectancy of life as of the date of the murder. A trust is then imposed
on the estate in favor of the other tenant (or his heirs) for the period of his life
expectancy.' 9 New York places a trust on the entire estate for the benefit of the
victim's heirs, thereby completely ignoring the "vested rights" argument. 20 While
opinion may differ as to the respective merits of these competing theories, it cannot
be denied that any one of them achieves a result far more just and equitable than
the precedent-bound decision of the court in the instant case. No court having at its
command the doctrines of equity jurisprudence is justified in confessing inability to
prevent the successful consummation of such a wrong.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-NUISANCE-INJURY TO TENANT'S SERVANT.-The plaintiff's employer had leased premises from the defendant to be used as a grocery store
and dwelling. The plaintiff, a domestic servant of the lessee, fell from the second
story porch to the street below when the balustrade collapsed because of its defective
and decayed condition. The defendant-landlord had knowledge of this defect. Recovery was denied in the trial court on the ground that the plaintiff, a domestic
servant, was so identified with the tenant that she could have no right of recovery
against the landlord. On appeal, held, two justices dissenting, that where a land.
lord lets premises in a condition amounting to a nuisance he is liable to servants of
the tenant for injuries resulting therefrom. Judgment reversed. Deutsch v. Max,
178 At. 481 (Pa. 1935).

It is well settled that an owner is not prima face liable for an injury to a third
person resulting from a nuisance existing on leased premises, but that the party
injured must look to the tenant or actual occupant for recovery.' Where, however,
the nuisance exists at the time of the letting, the owner is liable to third persons
for injuries sustained as a result thereof. 2
18. Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S. W. (2d) 757 (1930).
19. Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927); Sherman v. Weber, 133
N. J. Eq. 451, 167 AUt. 517 (1913).
20. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889) (will), dist. Ellerson v. Westcott,
148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540 (1896); Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y.
Supp. 173 (Surr. Ct. 1918) (tenancy by the entirety) ; Matter of Santourian, 125 Misc. 668,
212 N. Y. Supp. 116 (Surr. Ct. 1925) (joint savings bank account). The last case cited Is
squarely contra to the instant case. The court gave the entire account to the victim's
heirs despite the vested rights of the murderer and despite section 249 (3) of the N. Y.
BAN=G LAw which gives all to the survivor and makes no exception in the case of a
murderer. Accord: Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N. Y. Supp. 176 (4th
Dep't 1935).

1. Bailey v. Kelley, 93 Kan. 723, 145 Pac. 556 (1915), L. R. A. 1916D 1220; see Ahern
v. Steele, 115 N. Y. 203, 209, 22 N. E. 193, 196 (1889); 2 MCADAX, LANDLORD AND TENANT

(5th ed. 1934) § 298.
2. Some cases hold the landlord liable on the ground that having created the nuisance
he is presumed to have authorized its continuance by empowering another to continue It.
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Passing a full discussion of what constitutes a nuisance, it is well settled that a
nuisance exists in situations where there is a defect affecting another's use and enjoyment of his property,3 a defect in premises leased for public or semi-public purposes, 4 or a defect endangering travelers on the public way.5 That this decayed balustrade did not affect another's enjoyment of his property is incontrovertibly dear.
It could occasion no injury to another owner or possessor of land and tenements
with respect to his dealing with, possessing, or enjoying them. 0 Nor is the second
situation here encountered since the dwelling portion of the premises where the
accident occurred was not rented for public use but merely for the occupancy of the
lessee together with the members of his family and his servants. 7 Although there
are decisions to the effect that an insecure structure abutting over the public way
constitutes a nuisance as to passersby, s the plaintiff could not have been permitted
to recover on this theory since she was not on the highway when the injury was
Updegraff v. City of Ottumwa, 226 N. W. 928 (Iowa 1929); Cerchione v. Hunnewell, 215
Mass. 588, 102 N. E. 908 (1913); Ahern v. Steele, 115 N. Y. 203, 22 N. E. 193 (18S9);
Saphir v. Childs Co., Inc., 243 App. Div. 636, 276 N. Y. Supp. 1010 (2d Dep't 1935). One
jurisdiction reasons that the landlord, being in possession at the time of the demise, owes
the nuisance-suffering public the duty to abate it and must respond in damages for breach
of that duty. Bailey v. Kelley, 93 Kan. 723, 145 Pac. 556 (1915). In England a different
rule prevails; there the lessor may exempt himself from liability, if he binds the leszse to
make repairs. Pretty v. Bickmore, L. R. 8 C. P. 401 (1873).
3. McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N. Y. 40, 81 N. E. 549 (1907) (use of
soft coal in factory injuring neighboring property); Wunder v. McLean, 134 Pa. 334, 19
Atl. 749 (1890) (property damage to adjoining landowner); see Note (1914) 50 L. R. A.
(,-. s.) 293; 2 McADA., LANDLORD A D TrsvAssT (5th ed. 1934) § 293.
4. Campbell v. Portland Sugar Co., 62 Mle. 552 (1873) (defective wharf); Junkerman
v. Tilyou Realty Co, 213 N. Y. 404, 108 N. E. 190 (1915) (defective boardwalk in
amusement park); Folkman v. Lauer, 244 Pa. 605, 91 AUt. 218 (1914) (defect in grandstand in baseball park); see Note L. R. A. 1915B 364.
5. House v. Metcalf, 27 Conn. 631 (1858) (exposed wheel in grist mill facing highway
frightening plaintiff's horse); Soriero v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 86 N. J. L. 642, 92 Ad. 604
(1914) (falling stone from wall injuring child); Zolezzi v. Kroll & Horowitz Furn. Co., 216
App. Div. 719, 214 N. Y. Supp. 205 (2d Dep't 1926) (falling sign injuring paszerby);
City of Reading v. Reiner, 167 Pa. 41, 31 AtI. 357 (1895) (defective sidewalk injuring
passerby).
6. See 3 BL. Coamm. *215; 3 CooLnY, TORTS (4th ed. 1932) § 398; Thayer, Public Wrong
and Private Action (1914) 27 HAxv. L. REv. 317, 326.
7. Liability is based on the fact that the tenant being required by lease to use the
premises for the admission of the public, the landlord participated in inviting, and thus
was under a duty to exercise reasonable care, as to the public. Folkman v. Lauer, 244 Pa.
605, 91 At. 218 (1914). But see Note L. R. A. 1916D 1220. Tennessee repudiates the
distinction between public and private use and holds the lessor liable in both cases if he
should have known of the dangerous condition. Hines v. Wilcox, 96 Tenn. 148, 33 S. W.
914 (1896).
8. Howard v. Central Amusement Co., 224 Mass. 344, 112 N. E. 857 (1916) (stucco
ornament); Zolezzi v. Kroll & Horowitz Furn. Co., 216 App. Div. 719, 214 N. Y. Supp.
205 (2d Dep't 1926) (sign); see Whitmore v. Orono Pulp & Paper Co., 91 Me. 297, 303,
39 Atl. 1032, 1034 (1898).
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sustained. Moreover, she was occupying the premises under the lessee's rights,o
and hence was not within the class of persons to whom the landlord owed a con.
tinuing duty.' 0
Prescinding from the question of the defendant's liability as to strangers for
nuisance, there remains the question of his liability to the plaintiff as an invitee of
the tenant. A recovery on the latter ground can be sustained only on the ground
that the defect occasioning the injury was a latent one, but in the instant case the
evidence was conclusive that the defect was patent. 11
Concededly, where the defective condition constitutes a nuisance which is danger.
ous to the general public-to persons not upon the premises-leasing the premises
should not relieve the landlord from liability, and his duty should remain as to such
persons until the nuisance is abated. Where, however, the tenant has taken possession and control, and the owner no longer has a right to invite persons upon the
premises, the tenant, not the landlord, must assume liability to his invitees and more
12

particularly to his servants.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ToRTS-GOVERNMENTAL AND PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS.
-The plaintiff, While walking along the sidewalk of the defendant city, was injured
by a stream of water from an unguarded high pressure hose negligently connected to
a hydrant. At the time, the defendant's fire department was engaged in extinguishing a fire. The plaintiff contended that because of the frequent occurrence of such
defective hose connections, against which the city took no corrective steps, a nuisance
had been created. On appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the declaration, held, one judge dissenting, that the declaration stated a cause of action. Judgment reversed. Siandal v. City of Jacksonville, 161 So. 383 (Fla. 1935).
Ordinarily, a municipal corporation is not liable for the negligent performance by
1
The municipality is
its officers and agents of governmental functions or duties.
9. Fraser v. Kruger, 298 Fed. 693 (C. "C.A. 8th, 1924); Sunasack v. Morey, 196 Ill.
569, 63 N. E. 1039 (1902); Green v. Hammond, 223 Mass. 318, 111 N. E. 875 (1916);
Clyne v. Holmes, 61 N. J. L. 358, 39 Ad. 767 (1898); Dadson v. Dixon, 179 App. Div.
491, 165 N. Y. Supp. 963 (3d Dep't 1917). Contra: Frank v. Suthon, 159 Fed. 174 (C. C.
La. 1908) (members of tenant's family and servants held to have greater rights than tenant).
See Note (1909) 17 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1161; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 356.
10. Maloney v. Hayes, 206 Mass. 1, 91 N. E. 911 (1910); Brady v. Klein, 133 Mich.
422, 95 N. W. 557 (1903); Robinson v. Heverin, 50 Pa. Super. 546 (1912); see Folkman.
v. Lauer, 244 Pa. 605, 607, 91 AUt. 218, 219 (1914); Note L. R. A. 1916D 1220.
11. A latent defect is generally held to be one not discoverable by a reasonable inspection by the tenant. Andonique v. Carmen, 151 Ky. 249, 151 S. W. 921 (1912); Kern v.
Myll, 80 Mich. 525, 45 N. W. 587 (1890); Federal Metal Bed Co. v. Alpha Sign Co.,
289 Pa. 175, 137 Atl. 189 (1927). But cf. Frank v. Suthon, 159 Fed. 174 (C. C. La. 1903);
Angevine v. Hewitson, 235 Mass. 126, 126 N. E. 425 (1920) (the court here seems to incline
towards a subjective test rather than the "reasonable man" test.) For further discussion
see Note (1900) 46 L. R. A. 33; (1926) 11 CoRN. L. Q. 253-256; Harkrider, Tort Liability
of a Landlord (1928) 26 MIcH. L. Rxv. 264-276; RESTATE=NT, TORTS (1934) § 358,
12. Missel v. Lennox, 156 Fed. 347 (C. C. A. 1st, 1907).
1. Harris v. District of Columbia, 256 U. S. 650 (1919); Kerr v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 208 Mass. 190, 94 N. E. 257 (1911); Heino v. City of Grand Rapids, 202 MIch. 363,
168 N. W. 512 (1918).
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then but an arm of the state and the consequent sovereign role endows it with the
2
same immunity from suit as that enjoyed by the state. But when acting as a legal
3
individual, performing private or proprietary functions for pecuniary gain or for
4
good of
for
the
than
rather
own
inhabitants,
its
of
well-being
and
the convenience
the general public, it is then liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for any
0
negligence on the part of an agent or officer! acting within the scope of his authority.
Because of academic distinctions, courts consistently experience difficulty in classify7
It is a highly formal and artificial
ing a given act as a governmental function.
8
justice which favors one injured by a city-owned garbage truck, but refuses any
0
compensation to the unfortunate who has been struck by a police car, on the ground
that in the latter instance the police are engaged in promoting the public welfare.
Today there is a distinct tendency toward the restriction of this municipal immunitylO Although the old rule is still applied in the majority of cases, some courts are
finding means to express their true conception of justice without openly repudiating
the orthodox rule of non-liability. The instant case is a pointed example of this
conscientious impulse of modem jurisprudence. All jurisdictions are in accord
that the police" and fire' 2 departments while acting in the line of duty are governmental agencies, and upon the facts in the principal case the court could readily have
13
But rather than permit the city to take refuge
denied a recovery on this ground.
14
in a sovereign immunity, a cause of action in nuisance was sustained.
2. Spaur v. City of Pawhuska, 43 P. (2d) 403 (Okla. 1935); (1935) 4 Fo02rNm,

L.

REv. 124.

3. Hoppe v. City of Winona, 113 Binn. 252, 129 N. W. 577 (1911) (operating toll
bridge); Olesiewicz v. City of Camden, 100 N. J. L. 336, 126 At. 317 (1924) (city-owned
asphalt plant); Sinsheimer v. Underpinning & Foundation Co., 17S App. Div. 495, 165
N. Y. Supp. 645 (1st Dep't 1917) (subway construction).
4. City of Pass Christian v. Fernandez, 100 Miss. 76, 56 So. 329 (1911) (collecting
refuse); Parask-a v. City of Scranton, 313 Pa. 227, 169 AUt. 434 <1933) (maintaining
playground).
5. Gebhardt v. Village of La Grange Park, 354 Ill. 234, 188 N. E. 372 (1933); Scibilia
v. City of Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 124 Atl. 273 (1924). Contra: Gilchrist v. City Council
of Charlestown, 115 S. C. 367, 105 S. E. 741 (1921) (liability imposed by statute only).
6. Foxen v. City of Santa Barbara, 166 Cal. 77, 134 Pac. 1142 (1913); Ray v. City
of Huntington, 81 W. Va. 607, 95 S. E. 23 (1918).
7. See Alaxmilian v. Mlayor, etc., of New York, 62 N. Y. 160, 170 (1875).
S. Bruhnke v. La Crosse, 155 Wis. 485, 144 N. W. 1100 (1914).
9. Aldrich v. City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N. E. 164 (1922).
10. See Angel, Sovereign Immunity-The Modern Trend (1925) 35 YAx L. J. 150;
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924-1925) 34 id. at 1, 129, 229, cont'd in 36 id.
at 1, 757, 1039, and in (1928) 28 COL. L. Rav. 577, 743; Borchard, State and Muricipat
Liability in Tort (1934) 20 A. B. A. J. 747; Doddridge, Distinction Between Govcrnrnetat
and ProprietaryFunctions of Municipal Corporations (1925) 23 Mlicir. L. RPv. 325.
11. Jones v. Sioux City, IS5 Iowa 1178, 170 N. W. 445 (1919); Adams v. Sclectmen
of Town of Northbridge, 253 lass. 403, 149 N. E. 152 (1925).
12. Vezina v. City of Hartford, 106 Conn. 378, 135 Atl. 145 (1927); Hilstrom v. City
of St. Paul, 134 Ilinn. 451, 159 N. W. 1076 (1916).

13. The dissenting judge observed that the gist of the action was that the accident
was due to the negligence of a member of the city's fire department. The maintenance
of a fire hydrant can not be classed as a nuisance. "The city is not liable for the
negligence of its firemen."
14. A worthy cause based on nuisance can be sustained without too much difficult,
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There are other examples of municipal liability for torts committed by functionaries
during the performance of a governmental service.15 One court attempted to overturn the common law rule of immunity, but the decision was subsequently overruled. 16 Not only the courts, but also the legislatures, have recognized the weakness
of the basic reasons 17 which are at the foundation of municipal immunity. B'y
statute, municipalities in several states have been rendered liable for the negligence of
their employees,' 8 but the courts still hesitate to hold a city where previously it was
immune from suit.19 In England, broader statutes of a similar nature have been
since a precise definition of the term is lacking. Melker v. City of New York, 190 N. Y.
481, 83 N. E. 565 (1908); Columbus Gas Light and Coke Co. v. Freeland, 12 Ohio St.
392 (1861).

15. A person struck by a fire truck has recovered on the theory that the city failed
to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition for lawful uses. The court considered
the safety of people using the streets more important than haste in getting to a fire. Maxwell v. City of Miami, 87 Fla, 107, 100 So. 147 (1924). Again, where a fire engine overturned after striking a hole in the street, the injured pedestrian was allowed to recover
on the ground that the city was liable for defective streets. Cone v. City of Detroit, 191
Mich. 198, 157 N. W. 417 (1916). Other courts have held the city liable by deciding that
the act performed was proprietary rather than governmental when the facts favored either
conclusion. Thus, Missano v. The Mayor, etc., of New York, 169 N. Y. 123, 54 N. E, 744
(1899) held that although the public health incidentally benefits from the cleaning of streets,
that function is not governmental. Contra: City of Louisville v. Hehemann, 161 Ky. 523,
171 S.W. 165 (1914).
16. Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N. E. 72 (1919). The city
was held liable for an injury caused by a fire truck returning from a fire; the court said
it made no difference that a governmental function was being exercised. This case was
expressly overruled by Aldrich v. City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N. E. 164
(1922), where the c.ity was held not liable when a police car answering a "box call"
injured plaintiff.
17. The maxim "The king can do no wrong," the bedrock of the theory of municipal
immunity, deserves no place in our legal system. It has been blindly carried Into our
common law from the Continent, where most monarchical countries have abandoned It.
See Borchard, loc. cit. supra note 10. The assertion of the "immunity theorists" that It is
better for an individual silently to bear his loss, than to burden the community, Is rapidly
losing significance in view of recent politico-social developments such as guaranteed bank
deposits, old age pensions and workmen's compensation.
18. Co, '. Gnr. STAT. (1930) § 5989 (city liable for negligent driving of school buses);
ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, Moore, 1935) c. 24, § 987 (1) (municipality made liable for Injuries
caused by the negligent driving of city fire engines in the performance of duty); N. Y.
HiGiWAY LAW (1929) § 282g; PA. STAT. AN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 75, § 212 (city jointly
and severally liable with negligent driver of city-owned vehicle) ; S. C. Con (Michie, 1932)
§ 7345 (city made liable for negligent injuries caused by street defects), construed to allow
recovery by one injured by a fire truck turning a corner; cf. Creps v. City of Columbia,
104 S. C. 371, 89 S. E. 317 (1916) ; Wis. STAT. (1933) § 66.095 (city liable to any person
suffering injury from city-owned vehicle in the performance of a municipal business);
Schumacher v. City of Milwaukee, 209 Wis. 43, 243 N. W. 756 (1932) (governmental
function is "municipal business," rendering city liable).
19. Devers v. City of Scranton, 308 Pa. 13, 161 AtI. 540 (1932) decided a fire engine
was not a "vehicle" within the meaning of PA. STAT. ANn. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 75, § 212.
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construed as imposing liability upon the state.2 0 It is encouraging to note that one
state, even in the absence of statute, has recognized that the assumption of community liability for injuries caused by a public officer is a moral and equitable
obligation. Thus damages have been awarded where there was no negligence on
the part of the public officer 2 l and where the state was without fault.2-- But since
these holdings are exceptions to the prevailing view embracing the immunity theory,
it is evident that unless, as in the principal case, the courts are to do violence to
settled rules of law, statutory reform is imperative.

NEGLIGENcE-Res Ipsa Loquitur-AiRPLANE AccmENs.-The plaintiff alleged generally that her intestate was killed when the airplane in which he was riding crashed
to the ground through the negligence of both the owner and the pilot, the defendant's
testator and intestate respectively. A demurrer was sustained on the ground that
the complaint did not state a cause of action. The plaintiff contended that the allegation of general negligence was sufficient to bring the facts within the rule of presumptive negligence. On appeal, held, three judges dissenting, that the demurrer was
properly sustained, the rule of res ipsa loquitur being inapplicable. Herudon v.
Gregory, 81 S. W. (2d) 54 (Ark. 1935).
Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will occupy a position of the
same importance in the law of air transportation as in the law governing travel on
land is still a matter of conjecture.' As the aircraft industry is still in the process
of growth and formation, so too, the law of aeronautics, borrowing from the older
branches of the law, is gradually developing and expanding.2 At the present time
But cf. Graff v. City of McKeesport, 316 Pa. 263, 175 Ad. 426 (1934) (city liable for
the negligent driving of police car).
N. Y. CODE or Civ. PRoc. (1919) § 264, now N. Y. CTs. or Cr.-Ams Acr (1920) § 12,
was rendered nugatory by Smith v. State, 227 N. Y. 405, 125 N. E. 841 (1920), which
decided that the state had waived its immunity from suit, but not from liability for the
torts of its officers and servants. To offset hostile judicial interpretation, the legislature
specified (N. Y. HiGHWAY LAW [1929] § 2S2g) that an "operator" should be deemed an
employee of the municipality "notwithstanding the vehicle was being operated in the discharge of a public duty."
20. NEw SoutH WALFs Acr, 39 Vicr., No. 38 (1S75) providing that "any pron ...
deeming himself . . . to have a just claim . . . against the government . . . may Eue at
law," was considered sufficiently broad to include a claim for a public servant's tort in
Farnell v. Bowman, 12 App. Cas. 643 (18S7). Attorney General v. Wemyss, 13 App. Cas.
192 (18S8) similarly construed CRow-N Surfs ORDnIANcx, 40 Vcs., § 18 (2) (1876); see
Note (1921) 13 A. L. R. 1276, 1279.
21. In Evans v. Berry, 262 N. Y. 61, 186 N. E. 203 (1933), compensation was given
to a bystander who was accidentally shot by a policeman pursuing a criminal. Chief
Judge Pound wrote, "The common law fixed a standard of liability which relieved the city.
The city has chosen to be more liberal." Evans v. Berry, supra at 70, 186 N. E. at 206.
22. Mundo v. State, 223 N. Y. 203, 119 N. E. 444 (1918) (guard killed by maniac
working with road gang).
1. See Osterhout, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur As Appied To Aviation (1931)
1 Am L. Rsv. 9.
2. In the course of its development, the law of aviation, of necessity, has qualified
certain well established legal principles. For example, the ancient legal maxim, cujus esrt
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the cases involving airplane accidents in which the doctrine of rcs ipsa loquitur
has appeared are few in number and diverse in conclusion. So few, in fact, that the
decision reached in the instant case is the first to define the line between cases to
which the doctrine applies and those to which it is inapplicable.
The conditions accepted as requisite to the application of the rule, as outlined
by Chief Justice Earle, in a leading English case,3 are: (1) there must be reasonable
evidence of negligence; (2) the instrument causing the injury must be under the
exclusive control of the defendant or his servants; (3) the accident must be such
as would not ordinarily have occurred had those in control used proper care.4 The
Circuit Court of Illinois 5 recently held that these conditions were properly complied
with and applied the res ipsa rule where the pilot of an airplane, which had been in
the air several hours, crashed, while attempting to land, into a tree situated four
hundred feet from the airport, which was clearly marked with obstacle and boundary
lights. These facts, in themselves, the court found, warranted the presumption
that the pilot was negligent in the performance of his duty to exercise due care.
In a similar manner, the rule was applied by a California court O in an action brought
by a plaintiff who was seriously injured when the airplane in which he was riding
collided with another in the air. Where there are such attendant circumstances the
court may properly assume that the accident would not have occurred had the
pilot exercised proper skill and due care in the handling of his machine. Cases such
as these, 7 the instant court indicates, rouse little question as to the applicability of
the rule. 8
A closer question was presented to a Massachusetts court o when a plaintiff sued
for the value of his property lost when the airplane transporting it crashed a few
solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, has been substantially narrowed in Its appli.
cation. For cases defining aeronautical trespass in the light of this principle, see Swetland
v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); Smith v. New England
Aircraft Co., Inc., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385 (1930).
3. Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 596, 159 Eng. Reprints 665
(Ex. 1865).
4. Although this rule has been accepted in the majority of leading cases, such as Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1908), slight variations can be found In several
jurisdictions, as well as in the text-writers. For instance, in Gritsch v. Pickwick Stages
System, 22 P. (2d) 554 (Cal. App. 1933) the court required that the actual cause be
otherwise unknown. This same requisite is found in Briganti v. Connecticut Co., 119 Conn.
316, 175 AtI. 679 (1934) and in 5 NVIGUoRE, EVIDENC (2d ed. 1923) § 2509.
5. McCusker v. Curtiss Wright Flying Service, Inc., 269 Ill. App. 502, [19321 U. S. Avia.
tion Rep. 100 (1932).
6. Smith v. O'Donnell, 215 Cal. 714, 12 P. (2d) 933 (1931).
7. Parker v. James E. Granger, Inc., 39 P. (2d) 833 (Cal. 1934). In Seaman v. Curtiss
Flying Service Inc., 231 App. Div. 867, 247 N. Y. Supp. 251 (2d Dep't 1930) the court
ordered a new trial on the ground, among others, that it was prejudicial error for the trial
court not to charge the jury on the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur even
though the plaintiff was content to rely upon his allegations of special negligence.
8. In English v. Miller, 43 S. W. (2d) 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) the application of the
rule was denied to appellee whose son was killed in the crash of an airplane engaged In
stunt flying, only because specific acts of negligence were relied on by appellee In the
original action.
9. Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport C;., Inc., 278 Mass. 420, 180 N. E. 212 (1931).
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seconds after leaving the ground. Unlike the cases previously discussed, this was
no clear-cut situation of negligent piloting; moreover the facts indicated that the
injury might reasonably be traced to careless inspection of the airplane before it
took off. Assuming that such was the case, the court rejected the rcs ipsa rule on
the further ground that the defendant, in fulfilling its obligation to exercise the
highest care, might well have delegated the duty of inspecting the airplanes to an
independent group of mechanics, skilled in the science of aircraft. Since there was
no evidence as to inspection and since the court did not take judicial notice of
the customs of airport companies as to the inspection of their airplanes, the plaintiff failed to show that all of the surrounding circumstances essential to the occurrence of the injury were under the sole control of the defendant. Such failure cost
the plaintiff the application of the presumptive negligence rule.
The instant case was grouped by the majority with those cases to which the rule
is clearly inapplicable, because the mere fact of the crash of the airplane to the
ground after several hours in the air, was relied upon by the plaintiff to warrant
a presumption of negligence. Such a fact, it was held, unexplained by any circumstance pointing to a lack of due care, is insufficient evidence of negligence.
True, negligence suggests itself as a cause but not with the same force as an unforeseeable change in the weather or some other act of God which might have con.
fronted the pilot without warning and caused him to lose control. Since the res
ipsa rule means simply that the very nature of the accident in the light of attendant
circumstances and in the absence of a reasonable explanation by the defendant, warrants the inference that the accident would not have occurred but for the negligence
of the defendant,' 0 the court's rejection of the rule is sound. With the reasoning
of this court, several commentators' 1 are in substantial agreement. They too argue
that the hazards of the air have not been sufficiently conquered; that the science of
aircraft has not been mastered to the extent that such unforeseeable changes in
flying conditions as storms and fog, cease to be a probable cause of an airplane crash.
Until it can be said that an airplane does not fall from the sky but for the negligence
of the pilot, with the same reasonableness' 2 that it may be said an automobile does
not run into a ditch but for the negligence of the operator, the law of aircraft cannot
follow the law of motor vehicles in the application of the rule.
The very fact that the industry has not as yet been able to eliminate the danger of
changing flying conditions, suggests a further argument against the application of
the rule to airplane accidents where there are no attendant circumstances. The newness of the industry, the contribution it has made to public transportation within
the last thirty years, and the universal interest the public has taken in its further
progress might well incline the court to refrain, for the present, from applying a rule
as stringent as res ipsa loquitur. Precedent for such a course can be found in the
early railroad actions, where the duty imposed on the common carrier was defined
in a manner broad enough to facilitate the further growth of the industry.13
10. Sweeney v. Erving. 228 U. S. 233 (1912); Robinson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 194
N. Y. 37, 86 N. E. 805 (1909).
11. See Harper, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Air Law (1928) 1 Am L. REv. 478; Dws, AmnowrAUTICAL LAw (1928) passim; Osterhout, loc. cit. supra note 1.
12. Holt v. Yellow Cab Co. of San Diego, 124 Cal. App. 385, 12 P. (2d) 472 (1932);
Bennett v. Edwards, 239 App. Div. 157, 267 N. Y. Supp. 417 (lst Dep't 1933). Contra:
Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 237, 196 N. E. 40 (1935).
13. In Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 67 Mass. 263 (1854), Chief Justice
Shaw refused to hold the defendant company absolutely liable for the loss of plaintiff's
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NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF PURE FOOD LAW AS NEGLIGENCE Per Se.--Tho defendant dairy company sold the plaintiff's employer a bottle of cream containing
broken glass. While partaking of the cream plaintiff was injured. Although negligence was the sole cause of action, the court charged that there was an implied
warranty that the cream contained no deleterious substance harmful to the person
using it. The Appellate Division held that such a charge was error but refused to
reverse, on the ground that negligence existed as a matter of law since selling cream
containing broken glass violated the statute forbidding the sale of adulterated
cream.' On appeal, held, one judge dissenting, that the error in the charge might
have affected the result, as the statute had not been violated. Judgment reversed
and new trial granted. Bourcheix v. Willow Brook Dairy, Inc., 268 N. Y. 1, 196
N. E. 617 (1935).
The rule is well settled that a manufacturer is not liable to third parties who have2
no contractual relations with him for negligence in the construction of an article.
An exception to this rule, however, has long been recognized in cases involving objects
inherently dangerous if defective. 3 Food cases are within this exception. 4 Consequently most cases involving food have been tried in negligence rather than in
contract on an implied warranty, since privity is still a necessary element to recovery on that basis.5 It is however, a difficult task for the remote consumer to
prove the negligence of a distant manufacturer, and as a result, the courts have
continued the prevailing trend of relaxing the doctrine of caveat emptoro In line
with that trend, when violation of a pure food or drug act has resulted in injury to a
consumer, it has been held that the defendant is negligent as a matter of law, on
7
mere proof of the statutory violation.

goods, when they were destroyed by fire in defendant's cars after their arrival at the depot.
The decision was grounded upon the premise that defendant's relation as insurer terminated
when the goods were delivered to the depot and a new relation of warehouseman was
created, imposing on the defendant an obligation of exercising only ordinary care. The
decision of Chief Justice Shaw is interpreted and commended in a well-reasoned article,
in Nelles, Towards Legal Legislation 1 (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 862, 885.
1. N. Y. AGicuLTuRE AND MAxzrs LAW (1933) § 50: "No person shall sell . . . any
unclean, impure, unhealthy, adulterated or unwholesome milk . . . or . . . cream ....

2. 2 Cooryv, TORTS (3d ed. 1906) 1486.
3. Heckel v. Ford Motor Co., 101 N. J. L. 385, 128 Atl. 242 (1925); MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916) (liability attaches irrespective of
contract).
4. See Notes (1922) 17 A. L. R. 672; (1925) 39 id. at 992.
5. Connecticut Pie Co. v. Lynch, 57 F. (2d) 447 (App. D. C. 1932); Pelletier v. Dupont,
124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. 186 (1925); Roberts v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n, 211 Mass.
449, 98 N. E. 95 (1912); Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., Inc., 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E, 576
(1923). Contra: Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920);
Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 At. 931 (1915) semble.
6. For a discussion of the decline of the caveat emptor rule see Comment (1935)
4 FORDH.Am L. REv. 295.

7. Armour v. Wanamaker, 202 Fed. 423 (C. C. A. 3d, 1913); Meshbesher v. Channellene
Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N. W. 428 (1909); Kelley v. John R. Daily Co., 56
Mont. 63, 181 Pac. 326 (1919) (legal negligence); Pine Grove Poultry Farm, Inc. v. Newton
By-Products Mfg. Co., 248 N. Y. 293, 162 N. E. 84 (1928) (negligence as a matter of law);
Portage Markets Co. v. George, 111 Ohio St. 775, 146 N. E. 283 (1924) (negligence per sc);
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The broad question of whether violation of any criminal statute is negligence
per se is a troublesome one and has not yet been settled by any generally accepted
principle. The weight of authority holds that such violation is negligence per se
even when the statute does not expressly provide for civil liability 8 But the plaintiff cannot claim the benefit of this holding unless it appears that he is within the
class of persons whom the legislature sought to protect,0 that his injury is of the
kind that the statute was designed to prevent,10 that there is a causal connection
existing between the violation and the injury," and, before he may obtain recovery,
that he was free from contributory negligence.'- The action is not a statutory one,'2
since the statute does no more than establish a fixed standard by which negligence
may be determined. The legal duty is no longer limited by common law principles;-the statute sets the standard of care to be observed. 14 Any conduct falling short
of that standard is negligence per se.15 This concept should not be aborted into
Culbertson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 S. C. 352, 154 S. E. 424 (1930) (negligence
per se). Contra: Gearing v. Berkson, 223 fass. 257, 111 N. E. 785 (1916); Cheli v.
Cudahy Bros. Co., 267 Mich. 690, 255 N. W. 414 (1934); Hox' son v. Foster Beef Co., 177
AtI. 656 (N. H. 1935) (violation of pure food law is not negligence per se).
8. Horn v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 54 Fed. 301 (C. C. A. 6th, 1893) (statute requiring tolling of bell at railroad crossing); Osborne v. McMasters, 40 MAinn. 103, 41 N. W.
543 (1889) (statute requiring label on poisons) ; Pine Grove Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Newton
By-Products Mfg. Co., 248 N. Y. 293, 162 N. E. 84 (1928); Gaines Leathers v. Blackwell's
Durham Tobacco Co., 144 N. C. 330, 57 S. E. 11 (1907) (child labor law); Peter-on v.
Standard Oil Co., 55 Ore. 511, 106 Pac. 337 (1910) (statute requiring label on distillates);
cf. Fleetwood v. Swift Co., 27 Ga. App. 502, 10 S. E. 909 (1921) (no recovery because
of failure to allege facts constituting a violation of the statute). Contra: Berdos v. Tremont
& Suffolk Mills, 209 Mass. 489, 95 N. E. 876 (1911); Doyon v. l!assoline Motor Car Co.,
93 N. 3. L. 540, 120 AUt. 204 (1923). In continental systems the wrongdoer's civil liability
for damages occasioned by his breach of the criminal law follow as a matter of course
and the damages are awarded in the criminal prosecution. See Thayer, Public Wrong and
Private Action (1914) 27 HAR,. L. Rlv. 317, 328.
9. Williams v. Chicago &A. R. Co., 135 Ill. 491, 26 N. E. 661 (1891); Tingle v. Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. Co., 60 Iowa 333, 14 N. W. 320 (1882) (no liability in the absence of ngligence for violation of statute prohibiting the operation of trains on Sunday); Di Caprio
v. New York Cent. R. Co., 231 N. Y. 94, 131 N. E. 746 (1921). But cI. White v. Levarn,
93 Vt. 218, 108 AUt. 564 (1918) (violation of statute prohibiting hunting on Sunday).
10. Platt v. Southern Photo Material Co., 4 Ga. App. 159, 60 S. E. 1068 (1903); Gorris
v. Scott, L. R. 9 Ex. 125 (1874). Contra: AlcKune v. Santa Clara Lumber Co., 110 Cal.
480, 42 Pac. 980 (1895); cf. Rosse v. St. Paul & Duluth Ry. Co., 68 Blinn. 216, 71 N. W.
20 (1S97).
11. Bjorasen v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 84 Wash. 220, 146 Pac. 575 (1915); see Ridge
v. City of High Point, 176 N. C. 421, 424, 97 S. E. 369, 370 (1918).
12. Portage Markets Co. v. George, 111 Ohio St. 775, 146 N. E. 283 (1924).
13. Michalek v. United States Gypsum Co., 76 F. (2d) 115 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935);
Giannavola v. General Ry. Signal Co., 244 App. Div. 65, 278 N. Y. Supp. 4S0 (4th Dep't
1935).
14. See Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 105, 41 N. W. 543, 544 (18S9).
15. Ibid.; HARPim, ToRTs (1933) § 78; cf. Martin v. Herzog, 228 N. Y. 164, 126 N. E.
814 (1920) (any wilful conduct falling short of that standard is conclusive evidence of
negligence).
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the proposition that failure to observe the statutory duty results in liability per se.1 0
The other elements of an action in negligence are still matters of proof. 17 Many
courts have refused to go further than to hold that violation of a statute is merely
some evidence of negligence.' s Others hold that it creates a prima facie case of
negligence. 19 Indiscriminate use of the negligence per se rule has been criticized, 20
since 2arbitrary use of the doctrine frequently imposes liability where there is no
fault. ' Attempts to avoid this difficulty may account for the irreconcilable decisions in jurisdictions subscribing to the majority rule. 2 2 Some authorities have
attempted to distinguish between statutes forbidding acts, and those imposing affirmative duties for the protection of others, violation of the former constituting negligence per se and violation of the latter nothing more than evidence of negligence. 28
Although the New York decisions are not in accord, the court in the instant case
conceded that a violation of the statute would constitute negligence per se, but held
that here the statute had not been violated.2 4 A sounder result could have been
achieved by declaring that the statute had been violated, but that such violation was
not conclusive proof of the defendant's negligence. To hold a manufacturer negligent
as a matter of law for violating a pure food statute is tantamount to making his
liability that of an insurer, 25 because in the very nature of food cases, the elements
16. Abounader v. Strobneyer & Arpe Co., 243 N. Y. 458, 154 N. E. 309 (1926) semble
(false labeling is actionable default).
17. Portage Markets Co. v. George, 111 Ohio St. 775, 146 N. E. 283 (1924); Bjornsen
v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 84 Wash. 220, 146 Pac. 575 (1915).
18. Michalek v. United States Gypsum Co., 76 F. (2d) 115 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) (violation of statute requiring suction devices); Kimball v. Davis, 117 Me. 187, 103 Atl, 154
(1918) (statute requiring license to operate engine); Marino v. Lehmaier, 173 N. Y. 530,
66 N. E. 572 (1903) (violation of child labor law); Doyon v. Massoline Motor Car Co.,
98 N. J. L. 540, 120 AtI. 204 (1923) (violation of speed law); see Lowndes, Civil Liability
Created By Criminal Legislation (1932) 16 Min-m. L. REv. 361, 369. But cf. Westover
v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., 180 Mich. 373, 147 N. W. 630 (1914) (while violation of ordinance is not negligence per se, violation of statute is).
19. Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Gillis, 68 Ill. 317 (1873) (violation of statute requiring
railroad to toll bell at crossing); McElhinney v. Knittle, 199 Iowa 278, 201 N. W. 586 (1925).
20. See Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action (1914) 27 HARV. L. Rav. 317; Morris,
The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability (1932) 46 HARv. L. REv. 453.
21. Kavanagh v. New York 0. & W. R. R. Co., 196 App. Div. 384, 187 N. Y. Supp.
859 (2d Dep't 1921) (operating a stationary signal with a bell attached at railroad crossing
does not relieve the defendant from the absolute statutory duty of ringing bell on engine).
But cf. Malloy v. New York Real Estate Ass'n, 156 N. Y. 205, 50 N. E. 853 (1898) (no
liability where defendant provided chain at elevator shaft instead of railing required by
statute).
22. A distinction has been drawn when an emergency is the cause of the violation.
Burlie v. Stephens, 113 Wash. 182, 193 Pac. 684 (1920).
23. See Thayer, loc. cit. supra note 19. But see Stevens v. Luther, 105 Neb. 184, 187,
180 N. W. 87, 89 (1920).
24. On the other hand Judge Crane, dissenting, urged that the statute had been violated,
saying: "I should think that milk or cream containing ground glass is unhealthy, impure,
and unwholesome." His argument receives added weight from the statutory definition of
adulteration. N. Y. AoGaIcUvrua AND MARKE's LAw (1933) § 46: "The term 'adulterated
cream' when used means . . . cream to which any substance whatsoever has been added."
25. See Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co., 267 Mich. 690, 694, 255 N. W. 414, 415 (1934).
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of contributory negligence, and proximate cause are seldom litigated. Furthermore,
since neither intent, wilfulness nor negligence need be established to prove violation
of pure food statutes,20 the defendant frequently will be held liable in civil actions,
when he is guilty of no wrong other than the mere technical violation of the statute,
a result never intended by the legislature. A justification for the instant decision
may be found in the court's attempt to prevent such a result, while at the came
time impliedly recognizing the rule of negligence per se as laid down by a previous
New York case.27 Future courts, refusing to entirely discard the doctrine of caveat
emptor, will be faced with the same dilemma unless the legislative intent in pure
food acts is more dearly defined. In the absence of legislative fiat on the point, it
is submitted that unintentional violation of the statutory standard of care should
be no more than evidence of negligence to be submitted to the jury with the usual
instructions as to negligence.

STATUTE or FRAuDs-PART PER O .AocEn-Surr BY VENDOPL-Pursuant to the
terms of an oral agreement for the sale of land, entered into by the parties, the
plaintiff relinquished possession of the premises to the defendant. During the six
year interim prior to commencement of suit, the defendant lived upon the premises,
partly satisfied the purchase price, and made a number of alterations and improvements. As a defense to the plaintiff's suit for specific performance, the defendant
pleaded the Statute of Frauds. The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff. On
appeal, held, that the plaintiff-vendor may secure specific performance of the oral
agreement to sell the realty since the refusal of relief would work an equitable fraud
upon him.' judgment affirmed. Walter v. Hoffman, 267 N. Y. 365, 196 N. E. 291
(1935).
Underlying the "hopeless jumble of contradictory cases that interpret the Statute
of Frauds,"12 there is discernible the one basic principle that a court of equity 'will
grant specific performance of a parol agreement to convey real estate where the party
seeking the relief has taken such steps in reliance upon the contract that to deny
him full performance would be equivalent to sanctioning an equitable fraud.3 The
fraud is not one which antedates the genesis of the contract, but rather one which
arises subsequently, when the defendant seeks shelter in the immunity conferred by
26. Kelley v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 Pac. 326 (1919); People v. West,
106 N. Y. 293, 12 N. E. 610 (1887).
27. Pine Grove Poultry Farm, Inc. v. Newton By-Products Mfg. Co. Inc., 248 N. Y.
293, 162 N. E. 84 (1928) (violation of N. Y. AcnicuLTura mD h ,urs
L, (1933)
§ 130 by selling chicken feed containing ground wire is negligence per se).
1. The discussion which follows deals solely with the estoppel feature of the part performance rule. It is recognized that in addition to showing the elements of an eetopp-l
a plaintiff must demonstrate that the acts relied upon to take the contract out of the
Statute are unequivocally referable to the contract. McCallister v. McCallister, 342 Ill. 231,
173 N. E. 745 (1930); Burns v. McCormick, 233 N. Y. 230, 135 N. E. 273 (1922).
2. Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to the Statute of Frauds (1931) 79
U. or PA. L. Iav. 440, 464.
3. WALSH, EQurr (1930) 402; Moreland, Statute of Frauds and Part Performance
(1929) 78 U. or PA. L. Rzv. 51, 53 ". . . the golden thread running through the cases
on part performance and the Statute of Frauds is the prevention of fraud.' Id. at 81.
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the Statute.4 In essence, the so-called doctrine of part performance 5 is grounded
upon an estoppelO which is interposed to prevent injustice.7
The widest divergence of opinion is revealed when the courts come to determine
the requisite acts which will place a party in such a position that irreparable injury
will follow upon the refusal to grant him specific performance. Varying combinations
of delivery of possession, alteration and improvement of the premises, and other
miscellaneous acts have been recognized as sufficient to warrant the exercise of
equity's extraordinary power to take a contract out of the Statute.8 Some state
legislatures have gone so far as to prescribe the required acts of part performance.0
The enumeration of definite fact situations which will call for equitable intervention
contrasts sharply with the discretionary nature of the remedy involved. Each case
4. Notten v. Mensing, 45 P. (2d) 198 (Cal. 1935); Gardner v. Platt, 68 S. W. (2d)
297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); 4 PoMRaoY, EQuIr JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) 3346 n.
Pomeroy is given credit for having coined the term "equitable fraud" which has since been
widely employed. Pound, The Progress of the Law (1920) 33 HIAv. L, Ry, 929, 943.
5. The rule is commonly expressed as follows: " . . . part performance takes a verbal
agreement out from the operation of the statute." PoxEROY, SPyciC PmRoaMANCn or
CoNTRACTs (3d ed. 1926) § 96. The term "part performance" is a misnomer. The taking

of possession and the erection of improvements on the part of the vendee, for example,
are not acts in performance of the contract of sale. Failure to appreciate this inaccuracy
has led to much confusion. WALsH, EQUTY (1930) 403. The theory of relief in the
Statute of Frauds cases is estoppel and not part performance. Note (1931) 75 A. L. R. 650.
6. In the majority of states, courts of equity grant relief on the ground of estoppel
without statutory sanction. Many state legislatures, however, have preserved the remedy
by statute. CoLO. CoMP. STAT. (1921) § 5109; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 16-504; IND.
STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1926) § 8069; MIc. ComP. LAws (1929) § 13415; MINN. STAT. (Mason,
1927) § 8461; MONT. REv. CODE ANN. (Choate, 1921) § 7593; Nmn. Coup. STAT. (1929)
§ 36-106; N. Y. RLr. PROP. LAW (1909) § 270; N. D. Comp'. LAws ANN. (1913) § 5963.
For the statutes of Alabama, Georgia and Iowa see note 9, infra. The enactments listed
above are substantially similar to the New York statute, supra: "Nothing contained in
this article abridges the powers of courts of equity to compel the specific performance of
agreements in cases of part performance?'
Four jurisdictions refuse to recognize the doctrine of part performance. Maloney v.
Maloney, 258 Ky. 567, 80 S. W. (2d) 611 (1935); Cole v. Cole, 99 Miss. 335, 54 So. 953
(1911); Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N. C. 363, 171 S. E. 331 (1933); Goodloo v. Goodloe,
116 Tenn. 252, 92 S. W. 767 (1906) ; cf. Interstate Co. v. Bry-Block Mercantile Co., 30 F.
(2d) 172 (W. D. Tenn. 1928) (in seemingly clear contravention of Tennessee law, the
court granted specific performance of a contract to lease, basing its decision upon equitable
estoppel, distinguishing the estoppel from mere part performance).
7. Stephens v. Collison, 313 Ill. 365, 145 N. E. 81 (1924); Parker v. Page, 270 Mass.
167, 169 N. E. 915 (1930); Wooley v. Stewart, 222 N. Y. 347, 118 N. E. 847 (1918);
Spencer v. Williams, 113 W. Va. 687, 170 S. E. 179 (1933) ; see Note (1931) 75 A. L. R. 650.
8. 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JuRisPRUDENcE §§ 2241-2248.
9. ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 8034 (5) (payment or part payment, plus possession); GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 4634 (recognizes fraud basis and lists as suffl.

cient part performance: full payment or part payment and possession, or possession and
valuable improvements); IOWA CODE (1931) § 11286 (payment or part payment, or possession under contract with consent of vendor, or any situation which prior to enactment
of statute would have taken a contract out of the Statute of Frauds).
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is bottomed upon its own circumstances. 10 Accordingly, it would seem the better
approach to lay down no narrow rule governing the elements which place a party
in an irrevocable position, but to be guided only by the more general principles which
seek to prevent equitable fraud. 1 This view, which appears destined to become
13
dominant, 12 has been applied in many of the cases.
A number of the early cases in which the vendor figured as plaintiff were decided
on the theory of mutuality of remedy.14 It is doubtful whether the doctrine may
3
But no matter what the
be properly invoked as a source of affirmative relief.'
general rule concerning the mutuality doctrine may be, it should not be applied to
the Statute of Frauds cases, for here relief is based upon an estoppel and as a
consequence, the acts depended upon to take a contract out of the Statute must
be the acts of the party seeking relief. 16 It has been suggested that, deprived of
the support of the mutuality doctrine, those courts which had committed themselves
to the "irreparable injury" theory would find it impossible to grant specific performance to a vendor.17 Underlying this suggestion is the contention that no conduct on
18
With comthe part of the vendor could be made the basis of an estoppel decree.
mendable directness the New York court in the instant case undertook to meet this
objection. It pointed out that for the period of the vendee's possession, the vendor
10. See Interstate Co. v. Bry-Block Mercantile Co., 30 F. (2d) 172, 177 (W. D. Tenn.
1928); Lembke v. Lembke, 194 Iowa SOS, 187 N. W. 863, 867 (1922).
11. Dean Pound has pointed out that a "conspicuous example of the acquiition of a
legal shell is furnished by the law of Estoppel. We now regard precedent as at leact of
equal weight with the equities of the cass on questions of equitable cEtoppel." Pound,
The Decadence of Equity (1905) 5 COL. L. REv. 20, 33. Again, the same authority str es
the need for ". . . some general idea as to the basis on which courts should act and some
analytical conception of the subject of taking cases out of the Statute of Frauds, as a
whole. . . "' Pound, loc. cit. supra note 4, at 942. He approves the test which includes
the theory of acts solely referable to the contract (see note 1 supra) and equitable fraud.
Id. at 944.
12. Moreland, oc. cit. supra note 3, at 79, 81.
13. Burns v. Daggett, 141 lass. 36S, 6 N. E. 727 (1886); Andrews v. Charon, 193
N. E. 737 (lass. 1935) ; McKinley v. Hesson, 202 N. Y. 24, 95 N. E. 32 (1911); Gardner
v. Platt, 68 S. W. (2d) 297 (Tea. Civ. App. 1934); Cannon v. Cannon, 158 Va. 12, 163
S. E. 405 (1932).
14. Andrew v. Babcock, 63 Conn. 109, 26 AtL 715 (1893); Lawrence v. Saratoga Lake
R. Co., 36 Hun 467 (N. Y. 1SS5); Cooper v. Thomason, 30 Ore. 161, 45 Pac. 296 (1896);
cf. Bechtel v. Cone, 52 Md. 698 (18S0); Rowland v. Cook, 179 Wash. 624, 38 P. (2d)
224 (1934) (plaintiff-lessor given specific performance of oral lease on mutuality doctrine).
15. WALrsH, EQurr (1930) §§ 6S, 69 (repudiates theory-vendor allowed specific performance on unique subject matter principle); Ames, Mutuality in Specific Perfornarce
(1903) 3 CoL,. L. R-v. 1, 11 (vendor-purchaser relationship makes purchaser equitable owner
-therefore enforcement of vendor's rights requires specific performance); Stone, The 2Mtttaity Rule in New York (1916) 16 CoL. L. Rmy. 443, 451 (agrees with Ames); cf. 3 Wr.Limsxo, CoNmcrs (1920) 2572 (modem explanations unsatisfactory).
16. The acts must be performed by the party seeking relief. Greenlees v. Roche, 48
Kan. 503, 29 Pac. 590 (1892); Palumbo v. James, 266 Mass. 1, 164 N. E. 466 (1929);
see Note (1931) 75 A. L. R. 650, 652.
17. CL=, EQun' (1919) 180.
18. Ibid.
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stood by in reliance upon the contract and consequently suffered an irrevocable change
of position by losing the opportunity to sell the premises. Again, the vendee altered
the property. True, these alterations took the form of improvements, but to deny
the plaintiff equitable relief would force him to accept property in a changed and
perhaps objectionable form. Other jurisdictions have recognized elements of estoppel
in the acts or predicament of a vendor. 19 Properly applied, the equitable fraud
principles provide a unitary formula for the solution of the Statute of Frauds problem. If the courts will follow them, order will replace confusion and the "hopeless
jumble" will no longer obscure the just and equitable claims of deserving suitors.
The instant case rises pinnacle-like among the precedents which may be relied upon
to attain this end.

TAXATION-TRuSTS-VALIDITY OF TAX ON INTEREST OF RESIDENT-BENEFICIARyi-

A state statute1 provided for a tax upon all investments, equitable interests and other
intangible property of persons residing within the state. Under the provisions of this
statute, a tax was imposed upon the interest of the plaintiff as the beneficiary of a
trust the corpus of which consisted entirely of realty situated both within and without the taxing state and under the control of a resident trustee. The plaintiff sued
to enjoin the defendant tax commissioner from assessing or collecting such tax. On
appeal from a judgment denying the injunction,2 it was held that the income was a
species of intangible personalty and therefore taxable. On further appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, held, three justices dissenting, that the tax was
levied on an interest in land and that since the land was situated outside of Ohio the
tax was invalid under the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Judgment reversed. Senior v. Braden, 55 Sup. Ct. 800 (1935).3
19. In all the following cases cited for the text statement, plaintiff was a vendor. Keats
v. Rector, 1 Ark. 391 (1838); Stewart v. Smith, 6 Cal. App. 152, 91 Pac. 667 (1907);
Gaskins v. Moore, 50 Ga. App. 529, 179 S. E. 422 (1935); Greenlees. v. Roche, 48 Kan.
503, 29 Pac. 590 (1892); Witt v. Boothe, 98 Kan. 554, 158 Pac. 851 (1916) ; Benett v.
Dyer, 87 Me. 17, 35 Ati. 1004 (1896); Palumbo v. James, 266 Mass. 1, 164 N. E. 466
(1929); Walker v. Owen, 79 Mo. 563 (1883); Brewer v. Wilson, 17 N. J. Eq. 180 (Ch.
1864) semble; Harris v. Knickerbacker, 5 Wend. 638 (N. Y. 1830); Reed v. Reed, 12 Pa.
117 (1849) semble; In re Fay's Estate, 213 Pa. 428, 62 Atl. 991 (1906) ; Johnson v. Puget
Mill Co., 28 Wash. 515, 68 Pac. 867 (1902); Huntington & K. Land Development Co. v.
Thornberg, 46 W. Va. 99, 33 S. E. 108 (1899) semble; Starin v. Newcomb, 13 WIs. 580
(1861) semble; see Felton v. Smith, 84 Ind. 485, 491 (1882).
In the cases cited below, plaintiff-vendor was given relief although the theory was not
clearly set out: Conway v. Sherron, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,147 (C.C.D.C. 1813); McCullough
v. Sutherland, 153 Fed. 418 (C.C.N.D. W. Vat 1907); Wimberly v. Bryan, 55 Ga. 198
(1875); Tatum v. Brooker, 51 Mo. 148 (1872); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 45 Mo. App. 626
(1891); Cramer v. Mooney, 59 N. J. Eq. 164, 44 Atl. 625 (1899); Steenrod v. Railroad
Co., 27 W. Va. 1 (1885). Contra: Luckett v. Williams, 37 Mo. 388 (1866) semble (a
vendor cannot get specific performance).
1. Oma GEN. CODE (1931) §§ 5328, 5388.
2. Senior v. Braden, 128 Ohio St. 597, 193 N. E. 614 (1934).
3. This note is restricted to the constitutional question relative to the taxing of land
held in trust without Ohio. It is not concerned with the other issue in the case, involving
the validity of the tax on the lands within Ohio.
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The instant case is a crystallization of an issue implicit but unexpressed in all the
recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court on a vital tax question, namely: is tax
legislation unconstitutional solely because it effects double taxation? Though the
minority opinion squarely answers the question in the negative, it is to be regretted

that the majority should have remained silent on an issue of such concern to the
entire country.
Double taxation as a federal question is commonly understood to mean the taxation
of the same "property" by more than one state. Vital to the position of the dissent
is the contention that "different legal rights founded upon the same economic interest
may... be compelled to contribute to the cost of government of two or more states
whose protection they respectively enjoy. . .

."

To support this contention the

minority found it necessary to prove that the interests sought to be taxed Vwere
separate and distinct from each other.
Firmly embodied in the law of taxation is the principle that intangible personal
property held in trust is subject to tax by the jurisdiction in which the trustee is
domiciled without regard to the domicile of the beneficiary. 4 Equally well established
is the proposition that no state may tax property outside its jurisdiction without
violating the Fourteenth Amendment.8 Marring the simplicity of these principles,
however, is the endless conflict concerning the nature of the rights of a cestiti quo
trust. Whether it is agreed that the cestui que trust has a right in rcyn it is at
least certain that he has a right in personam against the trustee, 7 a chose in action s
which, like others of its class, is taxable.9 In a number of states there are statutory

4. Price v. Hunter, 34 Fed. 355 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 188s); Welch v. Boston, 221 Ma_-.
155, 109 N. E. 174 (1915); City of Detroit v. Lewis, 109 Mich. 155, 66 N. W. 95S (1896);
People v. Feinter, 168 N. Y. 360, 61 N. E. 280 (1901); Note (1930) 67 A.L.R. 393; 2
CooLF.Y, T.A..oxO (4th ed. 1924) §§ 469-70; GOODRICH, CoNFLI'cr OF LI.Vw (1927) §
96; Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 587; 619; (1935) 4 FoanDMi-E L.
R.m, 352.
5. State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, S2 U. S. 300 (1873); Union Refrigerator Transit
Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925); Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83 (1929); Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v.
Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1929) (this is so whether the tax be upon property or an
inheritance tax); Johnson Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158 (1933); 1 WLiaron, Conrurc or L'Aws (3d ed. 1905) 163.
6. Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust (1917) 17 Cor. L. R v.
269; 1 BOGERT, TRusTs A,,D TRusTrrxs (1935) § 183; HousTo., E:-roncmw. or Dran
nT EQu=r (1915) 138; SALMozw, JuRIsPRuDu-vcR (8th ed. 1930) § 90.
7. Stone, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust (1917) 17 CoT. L. RLy.
467; .um-rxo, EQu= (1926) 111 et seq. These authorities maintain that the cesili que
trust's right is not a right in rem (good against the entire world) because the cestui has no
rights against a bona fide purchaser of the corpus of the trust. Moreover, the duties
which correlate with rights in rern are always negative, to wit, duties to forbear or abstain.
.As for the obligations which flow out of parallel rights in personam some are negative,
but some and most are positive. Therefore the right of the beneficiary seems to be
properly classified as jus in personam. See Langdell, Brief Survey of Equity Jurisprudence
(1879) 1 HARv. L. RLy. 55, 60; Hart, The Place of Trust in Jurisprudence (1912) 28 L. Q.
Rav. 290.
8. See discussion of choses in action by Fry, L. J., in Colonial Bank v. Whinney, 30
Ch. Div. 26 (1S95).
9. See Blodgett v. Siberman, 277 U. S. 1, 14 (1928).
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-enactments which purport to declare that the whole estate or interest in real property
held in trust is vested in the trustee and that the beneficiary takes no estate or
interest therein.10 These seem to be legislative efforts to substantiate the in personam
theory and to make the interest of the beneficiary merely a right to obtain a decree
against the trustee to enforce the trust.11 From a purely legalistic view-point, therefore, the Ohio tax was imposed upon the equitable interest of the beneficiary which
is entirely separate and distinct from the legal interest of the trustee.1 2 It is accordingly difficult to avoid the conclusion that the tax in question did not constitute
double taxation.13
It is well settled, moreover, that a state has jurisdiction to tax its residents on their
certificates of stock in a foreign corporation whose only property is real estate or
,chattels situated elsewhere;' 4 or to tax a mortgage of real property located without
3
-the state even though the land affords the oily source of payment.1 This power
to tax has not been regarded as capricious, arbitrary or oppressive, nor is it forbidden
'by the Fourteenth Amendment, for it is conceded that these interests enjoy the benefit
and protection of the laws of the taxing state. In the case at bar, the plaintiff's
land certificates are comparable to stock certificates in a corporation.' 0 It is difficult
10. CAL. Cirv. CODE (1924) § 863; MicH. Comp. L. (1929) § 12982; MmN. ST. (1927)

§ 8095; MoNlr. Rxv. CoDEs (1921) § 6790; N. D. Com'. L. (1913) § 373; N. Y. REAL
PROp. LAW (1909) § 100; OKLA. ST. (1931)
ST. (1931) § 231.15.

§ 11829; S. D. Col'u. L. (1927) § 380; Wis.

11. "He [beneficiary] had no interest in the real estate. The income does not come to
him as real estate or even as an incident of real estate. It comes to him as personal
property." Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 358, 376 (1882). The right to enforce the trust
is a chose in action and personal property in the hands of the cestul que trust. See
'Schench v. Barnes, 156 N. Y. 316, 321, 50 N. E. 967, 96f (1898); Melenky v. Melon, 233
N. Y. 19, 23, 134 N. E. 822, 823 (1922); cf. Chicago N. S. & M. R. Co. v. Chicago Title
610, 160 N. E. 226 (1928); Aronsen v. Olsen, 348 I1. 26, 180 N. E.
& Trust Co., 328 Ill.
565 (1932).
12. See Anonymous, Developments in the Law-Taxation 1933 (1934) 47 HArv. L. Rrv.
1209, 1224; Brown, Multiple Taxation by the States-What is Left of It? (1935) 48 HAR.
L. R v. 407.
13. "If the question were here I should not be prepared to go so far as to say that the
equitable rights in personam of the beneficiary might not have been taxed at the place of
their domicile quite as much as a debt secured by a mortgage on land in another jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the fact that the land is also taxed at its situs (citing cases). In neither
case, if the threat of double taxation were controlling, which under the decisions it Is not
(citing cases), would it seem that in any real sense is there double taxation, since the
legal interests protected and taxed by the two taxing jurisdictions are different." Concurring opinion of Stone, J., in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S.83, 96
(1929).
14. Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U. S.390 (1912); Hawley v. City of Maiden, 232 U. S. 1
(1913); cf. Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U. S.466 (1904); Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730
(1902).
15. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491 (1879); cf.Peck v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165 (1917);
Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U. S.276 (1932).
16. The corpus of the trust corresponds to the capital stock of the concern. Instead
of issuing shares entitling the holders to participate in dividends, land trust certificates
were issued representing a fractional part of the real estate, based upon the valuation
fixed in the deed of trust. These certificates entitled their holders to share in the net
rentals of the real property.
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to perceive a distinction between the taxdng of stock and the tax in issue except
in form.
The position taken by the majority rests, not on any close adherence to legal
doctrine, but rather on an economic view-point definitely opposed to "excessive"
taxation. The minority, on the other hand, is satisfied to permit increased taxation
provided justification therefor is shown in the protection of diverse interests.17 The
problem will not be settled until the court can agree on the fundamental question
which is in reality one of policy.

WOMxIEN'S COMPENSATION--zJURIES

SUSTAINED DuRNnG HonsE-PLAY WITH

FELLOW EirLoYEs.-Claimant, a longshoreman engaged in loading cargo on a vessel,
accused G, a fellow employee, of concealing his cotton hook of which be had no immediate need for the duties he was then performing. Not seeing the implement in the
place indicated by G, claimant began to wrestle with the latter and in the course of
the scuffle claimant slipped and broke his leg. An award was made under the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.1 On appeal
from a judgment of the District Court affirming the award, held, that the evidence
was sufficient to warrant a finding that the injury "arose out of and in the course
of his employment." Judgment affirmed. General AccidCnt, Fire & Life Assur.
Corp., Ltd. v. Crowell, 76 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
The general prerequisite for recovery in actions brought under workmen's compensation acts is that the injury both "arise out of and in the course of employment.' 2 In most instances, each element must be satisfied before compensation can
be awarded.3 In determining the first element, attention has been directed to the
causal connection between the employment and the injury. 4 On the other hand, the
construction of "in the course of" has been predicated upon the circumstances of
17. See note 13, supra.
1. 44 STAT. 1424, 33 U. S. C. A. §§ 901-950 (1927).
2. See (1935) 4 FoRD.As L. Rxv. 147 n. 3. This clause was probably taken from
English compensation law. Bohlen, A Problemt in the Drafting of Worhmen's Compensation
Acts (1912) 25 HARv. L. Rnv. 328, 329.
Orno GEN. CODE (Page, 1931) § 1465-6S reads merely "in course of employment" but
has been interpreted as requiring a causal connection between the employment and the
injury. Industrial Comm. v. Weigandt, 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N. E. 38 (1921). PA. STx.
Am-. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 77, § 411 requires only that the injury arise "in the coure of
his employment" and the courts have not demanded the causal connection. Sino v.
Bethlehem Steel Co., 104 Pa. Super. 357, 159 At. 230 (1932). UrT. REv. ST,%T. A.-m.
(1933) § 42-1-43 reads "arising out of or in the course of employment" but has been held
to require causal connection. Cudahy v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418 (1923) (italics supplied).
3. Larke v. John Hancock Mlut. Life Ins. Co., 90 Conn. 303, 97 At. 320 (1916);
Mclicol's Case, 215 ass. 497, 102 N. E. 697 (1913); Matter of Heitz, 218 N. Y. 143,
112 N. E. 750 (1916). Contra: Sinko v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 104 Pa. Super. 357, 159
AUt. 230 (1932).
4. Ex parte Majestic Coal Co., 203 Ala. 86, 93 So. 728 (1922); Larke v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 Conn. 303, 97 A. 320 (1916); McNicol's Case, 215 Mas. 497,
102 N. E. 697 (1913); see Brown, "Arising out of and In the Course of the lmployment"
in Workmen's Compensation Acts (1931) 7 Wis. L. REv. 23, 24.
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the accident with a view to time and place, and the acts of the employee.6 The
application of these guiding principles has encountered no little difficulty due to the
great diversity of factual combinations attending the cases. The attempt to classify
the cases, 6 while conducive to lucidity, has not abated the problem, for confusion
has arisen within each group.7 In the category dealing with injuries inflicted by fellow employees, it has become apparent that it is necessary to distinguish injuries
resulting from assaults for personal reasons,8 from disputes as to methods of work9
and from "horse-play" or frolicking among the employees.10 In cases falling into
the last group, the courts were at first unwilling to allow compensation, a 1 probably
because of the belief that the employee causing such injury was not acting within
the scope of his employment.12 In effect, this view reverted to the doctrine of the
common law that no recovery could be had against an employer for the negligence
or incompetence of a fellow-employee.13 An increasing liberality in the interpreta-

tion of workmen's compensation acts has tended to weaken the opposition to recovery for "horse-play" injuries. In several jurisdictions, recovery has been allowed
where the injured person was not a participant in the horse-play, 14 the courts re5. See note 4, supra.
6. E.g., injuries sustained during lunch-hour, while going to or from work, from acts
of strangers, and from fellow-employees.
7. Lunch-hour decisions: McInerney v. Buffalo & Susquehanna R. R. Corp., 225 11. Y.
130, 121 N. E. 806 (1919); Domres v. Syracuse Safe Co., 240 N. Y. 611, 148 N. E. 727
(1925); Schwimmer v. Kammerman & Kaminsky, 262 N. Y. 104, 186 N. E. 409 (1933);
Johnson v. Smith, 263 N. Y. 10, 188 N. E. 140 (1933).
While going to or from work: Harby v. Marwell Bros., 203 App. Div. 525, 196 N. Y.
Supp. 729 (3d Dep't 1922), aff'd, 235 N. Y. 504, 139 N. E. 711 (1923); Matter of Harris,
221 App. Div. 199, 223 N. Y. Supp. 738 (3d Dep't 1927); Aetna Life Ins, Co. v.
Schmiedeke, 192 Wis. 574, 213 N. W. 292 (1927).
Injuries inflicted by strangers: Porter v. City of New Haven, 105 Conn. 394, 135 At.
293 (1926); Spiller v. Industrial Comm., 331 Ill.
401, 163 N. E. 406 (1928); Matter of
Berresi, 242 App. Div. 279, 275 N. Y. Supp. 370 (3d Dep't 1935).
8. Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 151 Pac. 39 (1915); Humphrey v.
Tietjen & Steffen Milk Co., Inc., 261 N. Y. 549, 185 N. E. 733 (1933); Harden v. Thomasvile Furn. Co., 199 N. C. 733, 155 S.E. 728 (1930).
9. Keithley v. Stone & Webster Eng. Corp., 226 Mo. App. 1122, 49 S.W. (2d) 296
(1932); Matter of Heitz, 218 N. Y. 148, 112 N. E. 750 (1916).
10. Cases on horse-play injuries are collated in Notes (1921) 13 A. L. R. 540; (1922)
20 id. at 882; (1925) 36 id. at 1469; (1927) 46 id. at 1150.
11. Coronado Beach Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 682, 158 Pac. 212 (1916); Payne v,
Industrial Comm., 295 II. 388, 129 N. E. 122 (1920); Tarpper v. Weston-Mott Co,, 200
Mich. 275, 166 N. W. 857 (1918); Hulley v. Moosbrugger, 88 N. J. L. 161, 95 Atl. 1007
(1915); Federal Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Havolic, 162 Wis. 341, 156 N. W. 143 (1916).
12. See Cassell v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 115 Tex. 371, 385, 283 S.W.
127, 133 (1926).
13. See Chambers v. Union Oil Co., Inc., 199 N. C. 28, 33, 153 S.E. 594, 596 (1930);
cf. HARPER, A TREATIsE ON TnE LAW OF TORTS, (1933) § 207, wherein the author remarks
that the real purpose of the acts was to eliminate fault as a defense to the employer.
14. Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Board, 277 Ill.
53, 115 N. E.128 (1917); Chicago
I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Clendennin, 81 Ind. App. 323, 143 N. E. 303 (1924); Phil Hollenbach
Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S.W. 152 (1918); Matter of Leonbruno, 229 N. Y.
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garding it as a hazard incidental to the employment of persons in groups.16 Other
states have sustained awards where knowledge of habitually boisterous conduct could
be imputed to the employer. L6 Exception has even been made where the injured
party participated in the tussle, but was not an aggressor.17 In the principal case
the court regarded the conduct of G as precipitating the scuffle, and in effect removed the onus of aggression from the initial physical act of the claimant.
It is submitted that this is a somewhat arbitrary treatment of th controversl
issue as to whether abuse provoking an injury constitutes aggression,18 in view of
the rule of torts that provocation is no justification for assault. 10 While the decision may be commendable from a sociological standpoint in its effort to secure the
benefits sought under workmen's compensation acts, its legal justification under the
instant statute is difficult to ascertain in that it virtually imposes an absolute liability
on the employer for horse-play injuries sustained by his employees.
470, 128 N. E. 711 (1920); Goodwin v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 73 S. W. (2d) 660
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934) ; Badger Furn. Co. v. Champeau, 195 Wis. 134, 217 N. W. 734 (1928)
(modifying Federal Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Havolic, 162 Wis. 341, 156 N. W. 143 [1916]).
Contra: Payne v. Industrial Comm., 295 I. 383, 129 N. E. 122 (1920).
15. Chicago I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Clendennin, 81 Ind. App. 323, 143 N. E. 303 (1924);
Hulley v. Moosbrugger, 87 N. J. L. 103, 93 AUt. 79 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Matter of Lconbruno,
229 N. Y. 470, 128 N. E. 711 (1920); Cassell v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
115 Tex. 371, 283 S. W. 127 (1926).
16. Mascika v. Connecticut Tool Co., 109 Conn. 473, 147 AtL 11 (1929); In re Loper,
64 Ind. App. 571, 116 N. E. 324 (1917); Kokomo Steel & Wire Co. v. Irick, So Ind. App.
610, 141 N. E. 796 (1923); White v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 104 Kan. 90, 177 Pac.
922 (1919); Thomas v. Proctor & Gamble, 104 Kan. 432, 179 Pac. 372 (1919); Anderson
& Kerr v. State Industrial Comm., 155 Okla. 137, 7 P. (2d) 902 (1932); Standard Acc. Ins.
Co. v. Stanaland, 235 S. W. 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
17. Recovery allowed: Brown v. Vacuum Oil Co., 171 La. 707, 132 So. 117 (1930);
Matter of Verschleiser, 229 N. Y. 192, 128 N. E. 126 (1920); East Ohio Gas Co. v. Coe,
42 Ohio App. 334, 182 N. E. 123 (1932); Stark v. State Ind. Acc. Comm., 103 Ore. So,
204 Pac. 151 (1922).
Recovery deniek: Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Haynie, 43 Ga. App. 579, 159 S. E. 781
(1931); Triangle Auto Painting & Trimming Co. v. Industrial Comm., 346 Il. C09, 178
N. E. 886 (1931); Frost v. H. H. Franklin Mfg. Co., 204 App. Div. 700, 198 N. Y. Supp.
521 (3d Dep't 1923); Industrial Comm. v. Bankes, 127 Ohio St. 517, 189 N. E. 437
(1934); Richardson v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 46 S. W. (2d) 439 (TeM. Civ. App.
1932). In Plouffe v. American Hard Rubber Co., 211 App. Div. 298, 207 N. Y. Supp.
373 (3d Dep't 1925), claimant's pencil was taken from him in fun by a fellow-employee.
He slapped the other, who retaliated, causing claimant injury. It was held that since the
claimant was the physical aggressor he could not recover.
18. Marion County Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 292 Ill. 463, 127 N. E. 84 (1920)
(abuse constitutes aggression). Contra: Knocks v. Metal Package Corp., 231 N. Y. 78,
131 N. E. 741 (1921); Rydeen v. Monarch Furn. Co., 240 N. Y. 295, 148 N. E. 527 (1925).
19. Daniel v. Giles, 108 Tenn. 242, 66 S. W. 1128 (1901).

